IDSA COMMENT

The Aggressor Will Always Get Away

Ramesh Phadke

January 10, 2013

One of the biggest weaknesses of India’s security discourse is the failure of the Indian leadership to truly understand the nature and psyche of its Western neighbour. Pakistan, like any other country, does not like to lose face, is always ready to up the ante, initiate audacious and precipitous action, make noise, co-opt its benefactors especially the United States and China, demand international intervention and establish a sort of moral and psychological ascendancy and superiority over India. Once the dust settles down, it is business as usual including demands for a dialogue to resolve the core issue of Kashmir before bilateral relations can be improved. The rest is cosmetics. The Indian leadership seems to repeatedly fall prey to such ruses.

India, on the other hand, mistakenly believes that because Pakistanis talk, eat, speak and very often behave like us they are indeed like us; our long lost brothers whose wayward behaviour can only be corrected through sustained and sincere peace building as well as disproportionately large concessions because India is after all a big country which is focused on its economic development and can ill afford to be distracted by resort to arms. India is also convinced that Pakistan’s benefactors will not let that country sink beyond a point and intervene to ensure its survival. There is much truth in this assessment but history tells us a somewhat different story.

Right from the time of its birth, Pakistani leaders including Jinnah had convinced themselves that India had somehow cheated and short-changed Pakistan with British help and that is how Jinnah got a ‘moth eaten Pakistan’. Although legal, the accession of Jammu & Kashmir was also seen as another case of Indian treachery conveniently forgetting that it was brought on by Pakistani aggression and attempts to wrest control of the state by force. India committed its first blunder by prematurely taking the issue to the United Nations and compounded the folly by choosing the ‘wrong’ article/clause of the Charter, thus allowing Pakistan to become an equal party to the ‘dispute’ when in fact Pakistan was simply the aggressor and nothing more.

Thereafter, through the last 65 years, Pakistan has tried to settle the matter by resort to force whenever its leadership felt that the circumstances were propitious and favourable. A major mistake that Pakistan has always made and continues to make even today is to underestimate the resolve of India’s leadership and the capability of the Indian military. The defensive defence policy that India has followed in preference to military retaliation has unfortunately emboldened Pakistan, which continues to believe that it can always get away. Repeated attacks by Pakistan at Haji Pir, Kargil and Chhamb are examples of such aggressive behaviour.

Worse, every time Pakistan lost the battle its resolve became stronger to somehow avenge the previous defeat. The wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999 were followed by more aggressive and violent behaviour. India’s shooting down of a Pakistan Navy Atlantique, which had violated Indian air space, was followed by the hijack of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 in December 1999 as well as various terrorist attacks including KaluChak, Delhi’s Red Fort and the Indian Parliament. India did not retaliate to any of these provocations. It must not be forgotten that in the run-up to bigger hostilities, Pakistan always began with sustained heavy shelling of border posts and towns, as in Kargil in July 1998, to gauge the Indian reaction. In all of these incidents Pakistan’s losses were minimal simply because India had consistently demonstrated self-imposed restraint but to no avail.

The recent case of cease-fire violation and Pakistani barbarity should be seen against this backdrop. Once again a pattern is discernible. Pakistan has reportedly violated the 10-year long ceasefire on many occasions but since 01 December 2012 alone the number of such violations has gone up to 22. India has repeatedly been telling the world that the Pakistan Army resorts to unprovoked firing across the Line of Control (LoC) to facilitate infiltration of terrorists but somehow refuses to take action with the result that the world at large does not believe the Indian story. If it is true that Pakistan lost a soldier (Lance Naik Aslam) in the exchange of fire in Mendhar on Saturday last, India should have expected a tit-for-tat response from Pakistan. In 1996, when a Pakistani helicopter carrying a Brigadier was allegedly shot down by India over the Siachen heights, Pakistan lost no time and shot down an Indian Mi-17.

The brutal Pakistani response came on Tuesday simply because it had to avenge the loss of Aslam. It reportedly chose Mendhar because here the border fence is well within Indian held territory and Indian army patrols move along and inside the LoC but still on the other side of the fence hence making it easier for Pakistan to mount a raid across the LoC. Foggy conditions further helped Pakistani designs but it is not understood why the so-called Area Domination Patrol was moving so close to the LoC in such poor visibility and that too in the aftermath of the Saturday incident and when the Intelligence Bureau had warned of possible Pakistani action. What sort of area domination was achieved when the Pakistani intruders in fact return unscathed?

It is also noteworthy that the Pakistan Army was not satisfied with merely killing the two Indian soldiers and injuring others in the well planned ambush but had to leave a tell-tale signature, a sign of victory, by beheading and mutilating the body/bodies of the Indian soldiers in the medieval practice of victors building a pyramid out of the heads of slain enemy soldiers right outside their tents. The main aim of the exercise was never to hide the barbarity but to explicitly tell the Indian Army to not mess with Pakistan. Why else would Pakistan have returned the mutilated bodies of the brave Lieutenant Saurabh Kalia and the six Indian soldiers during the 1999 Kargil Conflict? This is the psyche that India needs to understand. No amount of cajoling or appealing to their better sense is likely to change this characteristic of the Pakistan Army. The Pakistani message is clear; “We have done what we had to; you want to escalate, do so at your own peril. Pakistan has thrown the gauntlet, try if you have the guts”. Pakistan knows full well that there will soon be a chorus from world leaders demanding restraint and cooling of tempers from both sides. Pakistan knows it can get away unscathed. This time, however, India cannot blame the Jihadi terrorists for wanting to provoke hostilities between the neighbours because it is Pakistani regulars who have perpetrated this atrocity.

The tragedy is that many among Indian decision makers are experienced and intelligent enough to understand perfectly well the real import of such brutal and barbaric behaviour but are unable or unwilling to devise appropriate responses in the vain and forlorn hope that Pakistan will somehow mend its ways and reform itself into a ‘normal’ member of the international community.

It is time India reviewed this thinking. Instant, hard and yet calibrated military, diplomatic and political response is needed since mere warnings and protestations have proved grossly inadequate to change Pakistan’s behaviour. It is not surprising that the Indian Government spokesperson is ‘perplexed’. While India cannot afford to respond in anger it must also not make the mistake of allowing others to meddle in its affairs but, in fact, show to the world that it is perfectly capable of taking care of these pinpricks and teaching its recalcitrant neighbour(s) a hard lesson if need be. To do this, India must, however, shed its misplaced and grossly exaggerated fears of escalation into a two front war if such limited military action was initiated; in fact, the world will welcome it.

The Indian Jawan is a simple man who is trained to obey orders but his morale should not be undermined by continued inaction and India’s faith in high sounding principles of international behaviour. The constant demand to withdraw the AFSPA from parts of Jammu & Kashmir when the Indian Army is repeatedly attacked by the so-called militants is already causing the Jawan avoidable anguish. He still routinely walks into harm’s way without a moment’s hesitation simply because he has vowed to defend his sacred land. But his unquestioned obedience must never be taken for granted nor should he ever be allowed to feel defenceless against such atrocities.

It is not as if India lacks the wherewithal to safeguard its borders. Intelligence gathering mechanisms, armed and attack helicopters, Special Operation Forces, specially trained Commandos and above all plenty of electronic air and space based means are available to accurately identify and strike at the enemy in a highly calibrated response with little or no collateral damage. But for such actions to be successful India needs to first show strong resolve and equally importantly initiate without any further loss of time a truly ‘joint’ planning process that includes all arms/agencies of the state. While politicians and diplomats will do their job by informing other countries of India’s concerns and limits of patience, let the military devise ways to ensure a permanent stop to future provocations from across the borders.

It is also time India considered the use of ‘drones’ or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) fitted with suitable weapons and missiles to punish the enemy; merely possessing them will however not help. There is a chance that such declarations of red lines and open preparations for military retaliation will raise a storm of protest and criticism by India’s neighbours and other countries simply because they are not used to India taking any action but that should not be allowed to dissuade us. By constantly resorting to legal action such as exchange of dossiers of universally known international criminals, India has been sending a wrong message to the world. What India must urgently consider is a declaratory national security policy that includes as a first step the recovery of India’s lost territories to its neighbours or national reunification even if it means waging a long struggle. The absence of such an articulated aim has in fact weakened India’s case. A bold yet calm declaration of red lines is the only way India can put the onus of peace on the other side. The Indian soldier is enjoined to not only defend the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty but more importantly its honour. We must not be found wanting in this sacred duty by neglecting the soldier’s honour.

Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Political Racism in the Age of Obama By STEVEN HAHN Published: November 10, 2012

 

A crowd participated in a candlelit vigil, “We Are One Mississippi,” at the University of Mississippi in Oxford on Wednesday. It was in response to a protest on campus after President Obama was re-elected.

THE white students at Ole Miss who greeted President Obama’s decisive re-election with racial slurs and nasty disruptions on Tuesday night show that the long shadows of race still hang eerily over us. Four years ago, when Mr. Obama became our first African-American president by putting together an impressive coalition of white, black and Latino voters, it might have appeared otherwise. Some observers even insisted that we had entered a “post-racial” era.

But while that cross-racial and ethnic coalition figured significantly in Mr. Obama’s re-election last week, it has frayed over time — and may in fact have been weaker than we imagined to begin with. For close to the surface lies a political racism that harks back 150 years to the time of Reconstruction, when African-Americans won citizenship rights. Black men also won the right to vote and contested for power where they had previously been enslaved.

How is this so? The “birther” challenge, which galvanized so many Republican voters, expresses a deep unease with black claims to political inclusion and leadership that can be traced as far back as the 1860s. Then, white Southerners (and a fair share of white Northerners) questioned the legitimacy of black suffrage, viciously lampooned the behavior of new black officeholders and mobilized to murder and drive off local black leaders.

Much of the paramilitary work was done by the White League, the Ku Klux Klan and other vigilantes, who destroyed interracial Reconstruction governments and helped pave the road to the ferocious repression, disenfranchisement and segregation of the Jim Crow era.

D. W. Griffith’s 1915 film, “The Birth of a Nation,” which played to enthusiastic audiences, including President Woodrow Wilson, gave these sensibilities wide cultural sanction, with its depiction of Reconstruction’s democratic impulses as a violation of white decency and its celebration of the Klan for saving the South and reuniting the nation.

By the early 20th century the message was clear: black people did not belong in American political society and had no business wielding power over white people. This attitude has died hard. It is not, in fact, dead. Despite the achievements of the civil rights movement, African-Americans have seldom been elected to office from white-majority districts; only three, including Mr. Obama, have been elected to the United States Senate since Reconstruction, and they have been from either Illinois or Massachusetts.

The truth is that in the post-Civil War South few whites ever voted for black officeseekers, and the legacy of their refusal remains with us in a variety of forms. The depiction of Mr. Obama as a Kenyan, an Indonesian, an African tribal chief, a foreign Muslim — in other words, as a man fundamentally ineligible to be our president — is perhaps the most searing. Tellingly, it is a charge never brought against any of his predecessors.

But the coordinated efforts across the country to intimidate and suppress the votes of racial and ethnic minorities are far more consequential. Hostile officials regularly deploy the language of “fraud” and “corruption” to justify their efforts much as their counterparts at the end of the 19th century did to fully disenfranchise black voters.

Although our present-day tactics are state-issued IDs, state-mandated harassment of immigrants and voter-roll purges, these are not a far cry from the poll taxes, literacy tests, residency requirements and discretionary power of local registrars that composed the political racism of a century ago. That’s not even counting the hours-long lines many minority voters confronted.

THE repercussions of political racism are ever present, sometimes in subtle rather than explicit guises. The campaigns of both parties showed an obsessive concern with the fate of the “middle class,” an artificially homogenized category mostly coded white, while resolutely refusing to address the deepening morass of poverty, marginality and limited opportunity that disproportionately engulfs African-American and Latino communities.

At the same time, the embrace of “small business” and the retreat from public-sector institutions as a formula for solving our economic and social crises — evident in the policies of both parties — threaten to further erode the prospects and living standards of racial and ethnic minorities, who are overwhelmingly wage earners and most likely to find decent pay and stability as teachers, police officers, firefighters and government employees.

Over the past three decades, the Democrats have surrendered so much intellectual ground to Republican anti-statism that they have little with which to fight back effectively. The result is that Mr. Obama, like many other Democrats, has avoided the initiatives that could really cement his coalition — public works projects, industrial and urban policy, support for homeowners, comprehensive immigration reform, tougher financial regulation, stronger protection for labor unions and national service — and yet is still branded a “socialist” and coddler of minorities. Small wonder that the election returns indicate a decline in overall popular turnout since 2008 and a drop in Mr. Obama’s share of the white vote, especially the vote of white men.

But the returns also suggest intriguing possibilities for which the past may offer us meaningful lessons. There seems little doubt that Mr. Obama’s bailout of the auto industry helped attract support from white working-class voters and other so-called Reagan Democrats across the Midwest and Middle Atlantic, turning the electoral tide in his favor precisely where the corrosions of race could have been very damaging.

The Republicans, on the other hand, failed to make inroads among minority voters, including Asian-Americans, and are facing a formidable generational wall. Young whites helped drive the forces of conservatism and white supremacy during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but now most seem ill at ease with the policies that the Republican Party brandishes: social conservatism, anti-feminism, opposition to same-sex marriage and hostility to racial minorities. The anti-Obama riot at Ole Miss, integrated 50 years ago by James H. Meredith, was followed by a larger, interracial “We Are One Mississippi” candlelight march of protest. Mr. Obama and the Democrats have an opportunity to bridge the racial and cultural divides that have been widening and to begin to reconfigure the country’s political landscape. Although this has always been a difficult task and one fraught with peril, history — from Reconstruction to Populism to the New Deal to the struggle for civil rights — teaches us that it can happen: when different groups meet one another on more level planes, slowly get to know and trust one another, and define objectives that are mutually beneficial and achievable, they learn to think of themselves as part of something larger — and they actually become something larger.

Hard work on the ground — in neighborhoods, schools, religious institutions and workplaces — is foundational. But Mr. Obama, the biracial community organizer, might consider starting his second term by articulating a vision of a multicultural, multiracial and more equitable America with the same insight and power that he once brought to an address on the singular problem of race. If he does that, with words and then with deeds, he can strike a telling blow against the political racism that haunts our country.

Russia-India-China Strategic Triangle: Signalling a Power Shift?

See this interesting IDSA COMMENT

Russia-India-China Strategic Triangle: Signalling a Power Shift?

Swaran Singh

April 19, 2012

The 11th round of the Russia-India-China (RIC) Foreign Minister’s meet was held in Moscow on 13 April. Prima facie, this impressive continuity in the Ministers’ annual parleys has gathered sufficient mass and momentum which makes this forum appear pregnant with the potential for global and systemic implications for the 21st century world order. Closer home, these cordial trilateral meetings have also generated positive vibes amongst the three foreign ministers, which gets reflected in their often rather soft responses in bilateral relations that have otherwise witnessed their own share of turbulences and irritants.

At the most visible level, the Moscow meeting of the RIC Foreign Ministers took place on the eve of two important international initiatives, and it seemed to have influenced their outcomes. The first was the UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting in response to the satellite launch by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the second was the Istanbul initiative on the continued crisis over the Iranian nuclear issue; the latter involved representatives from Iran, Germany and the Permanent Five members (P5) of the UNSC. Both these issues were discussed in detail by the RIC Foreign Ministers and their joint communiqué outlined their proposed strategies that seemed so directed towards these two aforementioned follow-up meetings.

The rocket launch by DPRK appeared to overshadow the RIC foreign Ministers’ press briefing and the follow-up banner headlines in next morning’s newspapers. The three Foreign Ministers’ expressed their ‘regret’ over this decision of the DPRK but, at the same time, cautioned against sanctions as the primary methodology to deal with this crisis. Instead, they called for ‘restraint’, especially on the part of DPRK’s neighbouring countries. The goal, they said, should not be to launch sanctions that will punish innocent people, but to get the new regime in Pyongyang to participate in Six Party Talks. This implied that the RIC Foreign Ministers’ were suggesting that Pyongyang be co-opted and socialized. They actually went a step further and “recognized” DPRK’s right to pursue space explorations and advised it to avoid escalation. The Ministers exhorted Pyongyang to explore possibilities on how it would expand its cooperation with the United Nations to overcome its limitations in pursuing research and development initiatives.

These views stood clearly at large variance to those expressed by US President Obama, who stressed on isolating Pyongyang as way to deal with, according to him, DPRK’s defiance of the so-called international community. In one voice, the US and its allies condemned DPRK’s rocket test as “provocative” and “threatening” to regional security. This was followed by the UN Secretary General describing the launch as “deplorable” and one that “defies the firm and unanimous stance of the international community.” The RIC Foreign Ministers’ joint communiqué, on the other hand, provided a strong reminder of two veto wielding members of UNSC—Russia and China—holding strong positions against sanctions, let alone slapping trade embargoes or military action, which have become popular in media commentaries since the regime change in Libya.

Similarly on the Iran issue, RIC have repeatedly endorsed Iran’s sovereign right to peaceful nuclear energy and have argued for resolving this issue through political and diplomatic dialogue, including between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On the eve of last week’s Istanbul meeting amongst representatives of Iran, Germany and the P5 of the UNSC, the RIC Foreign Ministers’ in Moscow once again echoed their position. The RIC joint communiqué also reiterated their concerns on Afghanistan, where increasing focus on the exit of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has made China, India and Russia focus both as countries with major post-ISAF-exit responsibilities as also major victims of terrorism. The joint communiqué devotes several paragraphs that underline their commitment to seeking stability in Afghanistan and reaffirmed their readiness to contribute to it within the UN framework or via other regional initiatives, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), whose members and observers have direct stakes in Afghan peace.

Similarly, the RIC Ministers’ joint communiqué also underlined the necessity of acting against the perpetrators of terrorism as well as against their sponsors and supporters. This was clearly an allusion to Pakistan and the instance of India asking for action against the masterminds of 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack. Beijing has also claimed that terrorists of East Turkistan Moment find allegiance there. Some of these issues were also discussed in bilateral meetings, which provided useful links in wake of the recent, rather assertive posturing of China on the issue of oil explorations in the South China Sea, off the Vietnam Coast. Both Russian and Indian oil companies are involved in prospecting in the area in spite of repeated Chinese objections. It is also important to note that this was perhaps the last RIC meeting by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi who is due to retire before the end of this year.

Finally, the momentum of the RIC Foreign Ministers’ Moscow meet was strengthened as it was held barely a fortnight after the BRICS Summit in New Delhi (besides India, China and Russia, the Summit included Brazil and South Africa). At the BRICS Summit, the three countries had taken similar, strong collective positions on the issues of the Iranian nuclear standoff and the Syrian crisis. These back-to-back fora, reflecting a collective stand by RIC and its visible restraining influence on how the US and its allies approach these issues, allude to the slow, subtle shift of the balance of global power towards regional powers. It must be noted here that this shift may not sustain over time or may face certain hiccups if the agenda of the grouping were to be expanded. The growing bonhomie amongst RIC is clearly visible in various other fora, from the United Nations to the G-20, SCO, Asia-Europe Meetings, Climate Change COPs, East Asian Summits, and so on. Conversely, this increasing assertiveness of alternative RIC strategies is becoming sufficiently noticeable and is inviting scrutiny by media commentaries that question such muscle flexing.

For long-term observers of the RIC strategic triangle, though, these overheated political commentaries and hype only briefly obscure the larger tectonic shifts in world politics. Other than their alternative visions on political issues, the RIC Foreign Ministers’ meet is gradually expanding cooperation between the three countries in several sectors, including disaster relief, agriculture and public health. There are regular exchanges amongst their academic, industrial and business communities. They have already set up subsidiaries like RIC Trilateral Experts Meeting on Disaster Management, Trilateral Business Forum, and Trilateral Academic Scholars Dialogue, and held other trilateral projects and conferences in these specialised fields. It is this expanding component of trilateral initiatives that remain the backbone of their growing mutual comfort and expanding weight relative to their global perspectives and aspirations.

China's Territorial Claim on Arunachal Pradesh Hostile Intentions and Local Fears

Read this interesting report of a Fellows' Seminar at IDSA

Namrata Goswami

September 3, 2010

Chairperson: Ambassador C DasguptaDiscussants: Professor Sujit Dutta and Dr. Srinath Raghavan

The presenter identified the more aggressive stance taken recently by China in staking territorial claims over the North Eastern parts of India as the key motivation for undertaking her study. She also expressed her desire to reach out to the people of the region through her paper. The differences in perceptions between India and China over the line of demarcation of the Sino-Indian border, with the McMahon line denounced in China as an imperialist imposition, was identified as a continuing problem. She then went on to examine the Chinese position on the boundary question from realist, constructivist and neo-liberal perspectives.

Describing China’s approach as “two-track”, Dr. Goswami underscored China’s enhanced economic and diplomatic engagement with India alongside persistent territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh. Within the framework of realism, the paper argued that China was following a "balance of power" framework vis-a-vis the India-US strategic partnership by upping the ante in Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that India remains tied down by its territorial disputes with China, and is wary of its physical presence in the eastern border. The paper also extensively reviewed the ideational factors underlying such claims as well as their expression both in rhetoric and on the ground. Chinese perceptions of India’s strategic perspectives including its position on issues relating to Tibet - were examined. Viewed from one theoretical lens, Chinese claims were attributed to the neo-liberal school regarding exploitation of local mineral resources including hydro-electric power potential. Infrastructure development sponsored by China and India’s neglect of the same were seen to foster a sense of alienation among communities in the North East.

Possible alternative scenarios, based on local narratives as well as on China’s evolving perception of itself as a player in the international system, were outlined. A policy of aggressive deterrence on India’s part, coupled with robust diplomatic action, was advocated. “Act Local, Think Global” was the message.

External Discussant: Dr. Srinath Raghavan

Dr. Raghavan drew attention to the intricacies of boundary demarcation processes and their implications for the case under discussion. He questioned the validity of the realist hypothesis that Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh were informed by an intent to “balance” India or the United States or both. On the theoretical front, he also did not find any merit in the neo-liberal model as yielding an enhanced understanding of the situation .

In his analysis, China’s approach has been consistently marked by a preference for inter-sectoral bargaining and as such, its stance on Arunachal Pradesh may not be construed as overly aggressive. He ended by projecting a scenario where the boundary dispute between India and China might at some stage be resolved despite all its apparent intractability.

External Discussant: Prof. Sujit Dutta

Prof. Dutta took the view that the contribution to enhancing the very limited understanding of local perceptions and spectrum of opinion on various key questions in the North East - was the most significant potential contribution of the paper. He cautioned against direct deployment of International Relations theories in deconstruction of Foreign Policy. Instead he favoured “Group-thinking Theory”, “Rational Choice Theory” and such other cognitive theories that account for domestic motivations and decision-making for delivering richer analytical output.

In his opinion, the balance of power paradigm fell short of explaining Chinese behaviour as India’s partnership with the US is nowhere near as developed as to pose a threat to and elicit fearful reactions from China. On the practical side he explained the futility of attempting a bargain revolving around the settled population principle. On the question of Tibet he lamented the near-absence of diplomatic engagement by China, characterizing its approach as self-serving.

Internal Discussants

The first internal discussant suggested that China’s stance vis-à-vis the North East and perceptions within the North East on critical issues could more usefully form the subjects of two separate papers. He contended that different theoretical perspectives were instrumental in decoding varied and separate aspects of the problem, pointing to corresponding policy implications.

China’s internal nationalist discourse and its staunchly anti-imperialist tenor were singled out by the second internal discussant as factors laden with implications for policy analysis and diplomatic engagement.

Open-floor Discussion

One participant described the significance of shared tribal affinities across borders in the region, asking why there have been no Chinese overtures to populations south of the McMahon line. For purposes of the study, he recommended closer examination of the chronology and record of India’s policy pronouncements and actions in the North East over past decades. For a more balanced picture, one participant suggested incorporation of Chinese writing on the subject.
According to one intervention, regional affinities in the North East have tended to vary across time and tribal divisions. The role of elites in the North East in playing up the Chinese threat to attract attention from the Indian centre was also mentioned. Water security and the related significance of the Bramhaputra were posited as considerations gaining in importance in China’s strategic calculus over coming decades. Threats posed to indigenous culture in the North-East by recent developments and interactions with surrounding regions were argued to be serious concerns. Addressing developmental concerns in the North East was argued as central to any sustainable resolution of on-going disputes. The gaping need for an in-depth ethnographic study of local conditions and aspirations was repeatedly raised in the house.

Chairs Summary

The Chair advised sharper definition of the research question, as the explanations for China’s original claims and its resurgent pursuit of these claims are likely to be different. He argued for paying closer attention to the growth-rate differential north and south of the McMahon line to discern implications for the future. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion.

Report prepared by Kalyani Unkule, Research Assistant, IDSA

China’s Denial of Visa to the Indian General: Not So Incomprehensible

Prashant Kumar Singh

August 30, 2010

Last week the Indian media reported that China had denied a visa to Lt. General B. S. Jaswal, General Officer Commanding Chief, Northern Area Command of the Indian Army, who was to go to China to participate in a high-level official meting. The reason cited for this visa denial is that he heads the command which comprises the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir: a disputed territory according to China.1 In the Chinese perception, granting visa to him would have amounted to, by implication, recognition of India’s claim over the state. This incident has offended Indian sentiments. But the need of hour is to maintain composure and make a cold assessment of the situation and act accordingly.

This is not the first time that China has indulged in such a brash diplomatic trick. The last decade has been replete with similar diplomatic manoeuvrings on China’s part. In 2005, Song Deheng, Chinese General Consul in Mumbai, confronted the then Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukharjee in the Q&A session at a defence workshop in Mumbai after the Defence Minister had said in his speech that China invaded India in 1962.2 The Chinese General Consul excitedly argued that China never invaded India! Later, on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006, the Chinese ambassador Sun Yuxi caused another diplomatic row by making a public claim that Arunachal Pradesh was a part of China.3

In April 2009, China opposed a US $ 2.9 billion loan by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to India because this money would be used in Arunachal Pradesh, which, according to China, was not Indian territory but Chinese.4 Nevertheless, India received this loan in June 2009 with the help of the US and Japan.5

India has also not forgotten how China created a high decibel diplomatic commotion on the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s election campaign visit to Arunachal Pradesh in October 2009 and later on about the Dalai Lama’s visit to the state in November 2009. On the issue of Dr. Singh’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, China almost issued veiled military threats to which the Government of India had to respond saying that the Indian military was prepared to defend its territory. Also, on the issue of the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh), the decibel level of China’s diplomatic uproar was so high that it successfully attracted the attention of the international media.6 Speculations were rife at that time that the Government of India might withdraw permission for the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang. However, during both episodes, the Government of India demonstrated a laudable equanimity and firmness and did not buckle under the Chinese pressure.7

Then came the issue of China not granting properly stamped visas inside passports to Indian citizens domiciled in J&K. China has earlier been creating problems in issuing visas to Indian citizens hailing from Arunachal Pradesh. But creating this sort of a problem to Indian citizens of J&K domicile was probably new and certainly without any provocation on India’s part. A Chinese Delegation to the IDSA argued that China could not grant a properly stamped visa to Indian citizens of J&K domicile as this would recognize India’s claim over the whole of J&K, whereas China also had a claim over a substantial part of the state. Simply speaking, the Indian state of J&K is a ‘disputed territory’ for China; therefore, a properly stamped visa cannot be granted to its residents. The delegation also argued that public opinion/nationalism in China did not allow its government to do so. Now, all the arguments given in justification of not granting a properly stamped visa to the residents of J&K have got extended to the denial of visa to Lt. General Jaswal as well.

The Chinese reasoning behind visa denial to Lt. General Jaswal or visa manipulation in case of the residents of J&K does not hold water. First of all, the shield of public opinion/nationalism is a lame excuse because acts like issuance of visa are routine office work. The public at large is hardly aware of or interested in such official routine. Moreover, no Chinese media report has stated that China has taken these steps under any sort of public pressure. China appears to be using public opinion/nationalism only as a pretext. Besides, the same Lt. General Jaswal had visited China when he was corps commander of the Tezpur-based 4 Corps in the equally ‘sensitive’ eastern sector in 2008. Lt. Gen. S. K. Singh, 14 Corps Commander at Leh, which again falls very much in the ‘disputed’ Northern Command, also visited China including Lhasa as part of a defence delegation along with then Eastern Army Commander Lt. Gen. V. K. Singh.8 And as far as ‘the disputed nature’ of J&K is concerned, why this sudden raking up of the issue in 2009-10! And what about Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK)! Pakistan’s possession of Kashmiri territory is also disputed. Reports indicate that China issues a properly stamped visa to the residents of PoK. The point is that China is not revising its visa policy towards the residents of J&K out of any sudden national awakening. It is, indeed, a studied political move.

All these deliberate diplomatic spats should be seen in the more substantive context of increased Chinese incursions into Indian territory, and China almost retracting its implied recognition of Sikkim as a part of India and the mutually agreed principle of not disturbing settled populations in the demarcation of the boundary arrived at in 2005.

In the post-Pokhran II phase and particularly after the India-US Defence Agreement (2005) period, China is viewing India in a different light. Now, it can only pretend to ignore India, but it is a matter of fact that it cannot really ignore India. The threat perceptions are mutual to a great extent.9 Although India lags behind China particularly in the hardcore military realm and generally on the overall level of national strength, the situation is not that much painfully asymmetric. India is a nuclear-weapon state. Its economy is growing promisingly and is well-integrated with the international economy. Besides, it has acquired considerable politico-military and strategic clout in the international comity. In the words of K. Subrahmanyam, the international scenario is generally favourable to India. Its closeness with the US is warily watched by China. All these factors together compensate for its military inadequacy in the face of Chinese conventional military superiority and makes India a considerable strategic concern which China cannot overlook. China is aware of all these developments. As many commentators have alluded, China perceives India as a country which can come forward to shoulder America’s military responsibility in times to come.10 Thus, as a result, in this phase, China is seen hardening its attitude towards India.

China is not comfortable with sharing space with India in international politics. It has been evident in its attitude towards India’s entry into various international forums like East Asia Summit and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It very much longs for a multipolar world, though it also wants Asia to be unipolar under its leadership. Its ultimate policy goal towards India is to tie it down within South Asia. Hence, it is not interested in resolving the lingering border problem between the two countries. It can afford to delay the resolution of this problem as the status quo is in its favour. It wants to keep the territorial dispute alive and thereby India pre-occupied with these problems. Now, it has become inclined to revise its earlier stand of neutrality on Kashmir and wants to complicate the situation there for India.

All these diplomatic rows and even the border problem itself are a symptom of the larger problems that exist between the two countries. Earlier in the 1950s and 1960s, Tibet was really the bigger problem and which found an expression in the border dispute. Now, as a matter of fact, Tibet should be no problem between the two countries. The Government of India is simply unconcerned about Tibet. But China is not ready to forget the Tibet problem’s Indian connection of the 1950s since Tibet and the Dalai Lama provide a pretext to twist India’s arm (Now, Tibet, shall we say, has become a problem for India!). The real problems are coming from the larger geo-political context. At present, the competition for status, influence and power is a real source of tension between the two countries. Besides, the dynamics of US-China-India triangular relationship and the race for resources are shaping India-China relations. Add China’s renewed emphasis on its friendship with ‘the all-weather friend’ Pakistan to this context, and one can safely arrive at the conclusion that China is in no mood to accommodate a rising India. China recently concluded a nuclear agreement with Pakistan. Its changed stance on Kashmir is also aimed at helping Pakistan. In this overall scenario, Chinese diplomatic manipulations and manoeuvrings like not granting a visa to Lt. General Jaswal are only bound to increase. India therefore should not lower its political and military guard against China.

Let us not over-emphasize the role trade can play in smoothening the relationship between the two countries. Trade cannot be a solution to everything especially when problems basically lie on the strategic plane. In this situation, trade rivalry can easily spill over into the political realm. In the same way that China appears to be considering India’s rise detrimental to its own global ambitions, there is every possibility that global trade can become a new turf war between the two countries in future. The only policy prescription for India is that when China becomes restive against India, it should find India well-prepared.

1. 1.Indrani Bagchi, “China denies visa to top general in charge of J&K,” Times of India, August 27, 2010, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-denies-visa-to-top-general-in-JK/articleshow/6442437.cms.
2. 2.“General Consul: China never invaded India,” People’s Daily (Online), 07 September 2005.
3. 3.Seema Guha, “China claims Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Chinese territory’,” DNA, 13 November 2006, athttp://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200509/07/eng20050907_207149.html.http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_china-claims-arunachal-pradesh-as-c...
4. 4.Out of this loan, $ 60 million was to be spent on a flood control project in Arunachal Pradesh.
5. 5.John Chan, “China-India border talks highlight rising tensions,” 15 August 2009, at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/aug2009/indi-a15.shtml.
6. 6.Sanjoy Majumder, “Frontier town venerates Dalai Lama,” BBC News, 10 November 2009, athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8351813.stm. In fact, Majumdar opined that India was showing, by allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang, that it was not averse to playing mind-games with China. His interpretation indicates how confident India was seen during this diplomatic tiff in the international media.
7. 7.“Govt says Arunachal integral part of India after Chinese protest,” Times of India, 13 October 2009, athttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-says-Arunachal-integral-pa....
8. 8.“As Tezpur Corps commander, Jaswal visited China in 2008,” Indian Express, 28 August 2010, athttp://www.indianexpress.com/news/as-tezpur-corps-commander-jaswal-visit....
9. 9.Manjeet S. Pardesi (2010), “Understanding (Changing) Chinese Strategic Perceptions of India,” Strategic Analysis, 34 (4): 562-578.
10. 10.Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan’s article “Understanding China’s Military Strategy” published in Strategic Analysis, 32 (6), November 2008 provides a very crisp analysis of Chinese military strategic understanding of India, the US and Japan. Manjeet S. Pardesi in his article “Understanding (Changing) Chinese Strategic Perceptions of India” analyses Chinese perceptions of “the so-called ‘quadrilateral alliance’ of Asia-Pacific democracies – the US, Japan, Australia and India.”

PGDCJ Workshop On Fundamentals of Video Production on 17,18&24 July 21010

 Workshop On Fundamentals of Video Production on 17,18&24 July 21010 at Institute of Distance education, University of Kerala

PGDCJ Workshop On Fundamentals of Video Production on 17,18&24 July 21010

India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials

Read the summary of the Interesting weekly seminar Presented at IDSA, New Delhi by Rajaram Panda

Chairperson: V. P. Dutt
External Discussants: Amb. Rajiv Sikri & Amb. T.C.A. Rangachari
Internal Discussants: Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya and Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan

Dr. Rajaram Panda presented his paper titled India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials on Friday, April 16, 2010. The paper’s main focus was on maritime cooperation between India and Japan and more specifically on the strategic dimensions of this cooperation. Dr. Panda argued that the looming Chinese shadow is the rationale behind this cooperation. First, he defined what a ‘strategic partnership’ means, arguing that the canvas of a “strategic relationship” was much larger than mere “political relationship”. A strategic partnership includes “defence, economic, and security dimensions in the relationship.”

Dr. Panda emphasized that there was a great convergence of interests between India and Japan in the maritime domain. He highlighted India’s unique geographical position, which makes its cooperation extremely critical for Japan in securing its sea lanes. Much of Japan’s international trade is dependent upon safety of its sea lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. He argued that security of Japan’s maritime and energy supplies prominently figured in its security calculus.

Dr. Panda discussed two high-level important visits in detail: the first being Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s visit to Japan, and the other Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit to India, which he characterized as a landmark visit. During this visit, an Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation Based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was adopted. This plan delineated a host of issue-areas in which a meaningful strategic partnership could be built. However, he highlighted the Japanese stand on India’s nuclear programme as a major irritant in what is an otherwise cordial relationship.

Discussion

Amb. Rajiv Sikri argued that the economic aspect of the strategic partnership should be part of this paper. He further argued that the China factor was an important factor shaping this strategic partnership, but it was not the only factor. There are other important factors also which require due focus. Besides, the importance of China factor will keep varying depending upon who is in power in Japan. The India-Japan relationship is not that undifferentiated as it is being considered. There are more nuances involved in it. He was of the view that the US-Japan alliance had not outlived its utility and should not be underestimated. As to the definition of strategic partnership, he said that India had very loose definition of the partnership. He further argued that a strategic partnership basically meant macro-level understanding, not micro. It should be dealt with on that level only. On the question of Japanese investment in India, he said that Japanese businessmen should understand how business was done in India. He argued that there was no point in Japanese businessmen constantly complaining about India’s business environment. They should follow the example of Korean businessmen and introspect how they have succeeded in India.

Amb. T.C.A. Rangachari raised some fundamental questions. He asked: if Japan was considered to be a declining power then why there was a need for an India-Japan strategic partnership. Similarly, why have a strategic partnership with the United States if it is actually declining. If the argument behind these strategic partnerships is a rising China then one must ask as to why China would not be a responsible power. Expressing doubts about China’s rise as a responsible power reflects the influence of Western thinking. He also said that the sea lanes had never been disrupted since World War II, thus, the security of sea lanes is not the biggest issue. He argued that we should not be uncritical of Western wisdom, which had actually projected India as a maritime threat in the 1970s. He further argued that the strategic partnership between India and Japan was ambivalent and Japanese perception of India was changing very slowly. Incidentally, he said that there was a minority view in Japan that favoured India’s nuclear programme.

Brigadier Rumel Dahiya argued that the geostrategic importance of Japan must be assessed while exploring any strategic partnership. Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan mentioned that the economic aspect needs to be probed more. He further argued that India-Japan defence cooperation has not been strong. He argued that we should also try to understand Japanese laws and constitution, which prevents Japan from participating in any collective security mechanism.

Concluding the discussion, Professor V.P. Dutt said that he felt that Japan’s new foreign policy was dubious, ambiguous and uncertain. He was of the opinion that Japanese leaders were making very vague statements about their foreign policy and they themselves may not be very clear as to what they want. He raised a larger philosophical point – the Japanese public seems to have lost interest in foreign affairs. Now, the question is whether Japan will remain confused or it will become even more confused.

Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Assistant, IDSA