Tuesday, September 14, 2010

China's Territorial Claim on Arunachal Pradesh Hostile Intentions and Local Fears

Read this interesting report of a Fellows' Seminar at IDSA


September 3, 2010

Chairperson: Ambassador C DasguptaDiscussants: Professor Sujit Dutta and Dr. Srinath Raghavan
The presenter identified the more aggressive stance taken recently by China in staking territorial claims over the North Eastern parts of India as the key motivation for undertaking her study. She also expressed her desire to reach out to the people of the region through her paper. The differences in perceptions between India and China over the line of demarcation of the Sino-Indian border, with the McMahon line denounced in China as an imperialist imposition, was identified as a continuing problem. She then went on to examine the Chinese position on the boundary question from realist, constructivist and neo-liberal perspectives.
Describing China’s approach as “two-track”, Dr. Goswami underscored China’s enhanced economic and diplomatic engagement with India alongside persistent territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh. Within the framework of realism, the paper argued that China was following a "balance of power" framework vis-a-vis the India-US strategic partnership by upping the ante in Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that India remains tied down by its territorial disputes with China, and is wary of its physical presence in the eastern border. The paper also extensively reviewed the ideational factors underlying such claims as well as their expression both in rhetoric and on the ground. Chinese perceptions of India’s strategic perspectives including its position on issues relating to Tibet - were examined. Viewed from one theoretical lens, Chinese claims were attributed to the neo-liberal school regarding exploitation of local mineral resources including hydro-electric power potential. Infrastructure development sponsored by China and India’s neglect of the same were seen to foster a sense of alienation among communities in the North East.
Possible alternative scenarios, based on local narratives as well as on China’s evolving perception of itself as a player in the international system, were outlined. A policy of aggressive deterrence on India’s part, coupled with robust diplomatic action, was advocated. “Act Local, Think Global” was the message.

External Discussant: Dr. Srinath Raghavan

Dr. Raghavan drew attention to the intricacies of boundary demarcation processes and their implications for the case under discussion. He questioned the validity of the realist hypothesis that Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh were informed by an intent to “balance” India or the United States or both. On the theoretical front, he also did not find any merit in the neo-liberal model as yielding an enhanced understanding of the situation .
In his analysis, China’s approach has been consistently marked by a preference for inter-sectoral bargaining and as such, its stance on Arunachal Pradesh may not be construed as overly aggressive. He ended by projecting a scenario where the boundary dispute between India and China might at some stage be resolved despite all its apparent intractability.

External Discussant: Prof. Sujit Dutta

Prof. Dutta took the view that the contribution to enhancing the very limited understanding of local perceptions and spectrum of opinion on various key questions in the North East - was the most significant potential contribution of the paper. He cautioned against direct deployment of International Relations theories in deconstruction of Foreign Policy. Instead he favoured “Group-thinking Theory”, “Rational Choice Theory” and such other cognitive theories that account for domestic motivations and decision-making for delivering richer analytical output.
In his opinion, the balance of power paradigm fell short of explaining Chinese behaviour as India’s partnership with the US is nowhere near as developed as to pose a threat to and elicit fearful reactions from China. On the practical side he explained the futility of attempting a bargain revolving around the settled population principle. On the question of Tibet he lamented the near-absence of diplomatic engagement by China, characterizing its approach as self-serving.

Internal Discussants

The first internal discussant suggested that China’s stance vis-à-vis the North East and perceptions within the North East on critical issues could more usefully form the subjects of two separate papers. He contended that different theoretical perspectives were instrumental in decoding varied and separate aspects of the problem, pointing to corresponding policy implications.
China’s internal nationalist discourse and its staunchly anti-imperialist tenor were singled out by the second internal discussant as factors laden with implications for policy analysis and diplomatic engagement.

Open-floor Discussion

One participant described the significance of shared tribal affinities across borders in the region, asking why there have been no Chinese overtures to populations south of the McMahon line. For purposes of the study, he recommended closer examination of the chronology and record of India’s policy pronouncements and actions in the North East over past decades. For a more balanced picture, one participant suggested incorporation of Chinese writing on the subject.
According to one intervention, regional affinities in the North East have tended to vary across time and tribal divisions. The role of elites in the North East in playing up the Chinese threat to attract attention from the Indian centre was also mentioned. Water security and the related significance of the Bramhaputra were posited as considerations gaining in importance in China’s strategic calculus over coming decades. Threats posed to indigenous culture in the North-East by recent developments and interactions with surrounding regions were argued to be serious concerns. Addressing developmental concerns in the North East was argued as central to any sustainable resolution of on-going disputes. The gaping need for an in-depth ethnographic study of local conditions and aspirations was repeatedly raised in the house.

Chairs Summary

The Chair advised sharper definition of the research question, as the explanations for China’s original claims and its resurgent pursuit of these claims are likely to be different. He argued for paying closer attention to the growth-rate differential north and south of the McMahon line to discern implications for the future. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion.
Report prepared by Kalyani Unkule, Research Assistant, IDSA

Tuesday, August 31, 2010

China’s Denial of Visa to the Indian General: Not So Incomprehensible


August 30, 2010
Last week the Indian media reported that China had denied a visa to Lt. General B. S. Jaswal, General Officer Commanding Chief, Northern Area Command of the Indian Army, who was to go to China to participate in a high-level official meting. The reason cited for this visa denial is that he heads the command which comprises the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir: a disputed territory according to China.1 In the Chinese perception, granting visa to him would have amounted to, by implication, recognition of India’s claim over the state. This incident has offended Indian sentiments. But the need of hour is to maintain composure and make a cold assessment of the situation and act accordingly.
This is not the first time that China has indulged in such a brash diplomatic trick. The last decade has been replete with similar diplomatic manoeuvrings on China’s part. In 2005, Song Deheng, Chinese General Consul in Mumbai, confronted the then Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukharjee in the Q&A session at a defence workshop in Mumbai after the Defence Minister had said in his speech that China invaded India in 1962.2 The Chinese General Consul excitedly argued that China never invaded India! Later, on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006, the Chinese ambassador Sun Yuxi caused another diplomatic row by making a public claim that Arunachal Pradesh was a part of China.3
In April 2009, China opposed a US $ 2.9 billion loan by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to India because this money would be used in Arunachal Pradesh, which, according to China, was not Indian territory but Chinese.4 Nevertheless, India received this loan in June 2009 with the help of the US and Japan.5
India has also not forgotten how China created a high decibel diplomatic commotion on the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s election campaign visit to Arunachal Pradesh in October 2009 and later on about the Dalai Lama’s visit to the state in November 2009. On the issue of Dr. Singh’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, China almost issued veiled military threats to which the Government of India had to respond saying that the Indian military was prepared to defend its territory. Also, on the issue of the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh), the decibel level of China’s diplomatic uproar was so high that it successfully attracted the attention of the international media.6 Speculations were rife at that time that the Government of India might withdraw permission for the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang. However, during both episodes, the Government of India demonstrated a laudable equanimity and firmness and did not buckle under the Chinese pressure.7
Then came the issue of China not granting properly stamped visas inside passports to Indian citizens domiciled in J&K. China has earlier been creating problems in issuing visas to Indian citizens hailing from Arunachal Pradesh. But creating this sort of a problem to Indian citizens of J&K domicile was probably new and certainly without any provocation on India’s part. A Chinese Delegation to the IDSA argued that China could not grant a properly stamped visa to Indian citizens of J&K domicile as this would recognize India’s claim over the whole of J&K, whereas China also had a claim over a substantial part of the state. Simply speaking, the Indian state of J&K is a ‘disputed territory’ for China; therefore, a properly stamped visa cannot be granted to its residents. The delegation also argued that public opinion/nationalism in China did not allow its government to do so. Now, all the arguments given in justification of not granting a properly stamped visa to the residents of J&K have got extended to the denial of visa to Lt. General Jaswal as well.
The Chinese reasoning behind visa denial to Lt. General Jaswal or visa manipulation in case of the residents of J&K does not hold water. First of all, the shield of public opinion/nationalism is a lame excuse because acts like issuance of visa are routine office work. The public at large is hardly aware of or interested in such official routine. Moreover, no Chinese media report has stated that China has taken these steps under any sort of public pressure. China appears to be using public opinion/nationalism only as a pretext. Besides, the same Lt. General Jaswal had visited China when he was corps commander of the Tezpur-based 4 Corps in the equally ‘sensitive’ eastern sector in 2008. Lt. Gen. S. K. Singh, 14 Corps Commander at Leh, which again falls very much in the ‘disputed’ Northern Command, also visited China including Lhasa as part of a defence delegation along with then Eastern Army Commander Lt. Gen. V. K. Singh.8 And as far as ‘the disputed nature’ of J&K is concerned, why this sudden raking up of the issue in 2009-10! And what about Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK)! Pakistan’s possession of Kashmiri territory is also disputed. Reports indicate that China issues a properly stamped visa to the residents of PoK. The point is that China is not revising its visa policy towards the residents of J&K out of any sudden national awakening. It is, indeed, a studied political move.
All these deliberate diplomatic spats should be seen in the more substantive context of increased Chinese incursions into Indian territory, and China almost retracting its implied recognition of Sikkim as a part of India and the mutually agreed principle of not disturbing settled populations in the demarcation of the boundary arrived at in 2005.
In the post-Pokhran II phase and particularly after the India-US Defence Agreement (2005) period, China is viewing India in a different light. Now, it can only pretend to ignore India, but it is a matter of fact that it cannot really ignore India. The threat perceptions are mutual to a great extent.9 Although India lags behind China particularly in the hardcore military realm and generally on the overall level of national strength, the situation is not that much painfully asymmetric. India is a nuclear-weapon state. Its economy is growing promisingly and is well-integrated with the international economy. Besides, it has acquired considerable politico-military and strategic clout in the international comity. In the words of K. Subrahmanyam, the international scenario is generally favourable to India. Its closeness with the US is warily watched by China. All these factors together compensate for its military inadequacy in the face of Chinese conventional military superiority and makes India a considerable strategic concern which China cannot overlook. China is aware of all these developments. As many commentators have alluded, China perceives India as a country which can come forward to shoulder America’s military responsibility in times to come.10 Thus, as a result, in this phase, China is seen hardening its attitude towards India.
China is not comfortable with sharing space with India in international politics. It has been evident in its attitude towards India’s entry into various international forums like East Asia Summit and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It very much longs for a multipolar world, though it also wants Asia to be unipolar under its leadership. Its ultimate policy goal towards India is to tie it down within South Asia. Hence, it is not interested in resolving the lingering border problem between the two countries. It can afford to delay the resolution of this problem as the status quo is in its favour. It wants to keep the territorial dispute alive and thereby India pre-occupied with these problems. Now, it has become inclined to revise its earlier stand of neutrality on Kashmir and wants to complicate the situation there for India.
All these diplomatic rows and even the border problem itself are a symptom of the larger problems that exist between the two countries. Earlier in the 1950s and 1960s, Tibet was really the bigger problem and which found an expression in the border dispute. Now, as a matter of fact, Tibet should be no problem between the two countries. The Government of India is simply unconcerned about Tibet. But China is not ready to forget the Tibet problem’s Indian connection of the 1950s since Tibet and the Dalai Lama provide a pretext to twist India’s arm (Now, Tibet, shall we say, has become a problem for India!). The real problems are coming from the larger geo-political context. At present, the competition for status, influence and power is a real source of tension between the two countries. Besides, the dynamics of US-China-India triangular relationship and the race for resources are shaping India-China relations. Add China’s renewed emphasis on its friendship with ‘the all-weather friend’ Pakistan to this context, and one can safely arrive at the conclusion that China is in no mood to accommodate a rising India. China recently concluded a nuclear agreement with Pakistan. Its changed stance on Kashmir is also aimed at helping Pakistan. In this overall scenario, Chinese diplomatic manipulations and manoeuvrings like not granting a visa to Lt. General Jaswal are only bound to increase. India therefore should not lower its political and military guard against China.
Let us not over-emphasize the role trade can play in smoothening the relationship between the two countries. Trade cannot be a solution to everything especially when problems basically lie on the strategic plane. In this situation, trade rivalry can easily spill over into the political realm. In the same way that China appears to be considering India’s rise detrimental to its own global ambitions, there is every possibility that global trade can become a new turf war between the two countries in future. The only policy prescription for India is that when China becomes restive against India, it should find India well-prepared.
  1. 1.Indrani Bagchi, “China denies visa to top general in charge of J&K,” Times of India, August 27, 2010, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-denies-visa-to-top-general-in-JK/articleshow/6442437.cms.
  2. 2.“General Consul: China never invaded India,” People’s Daily (Online), 07 September 2005.
  3. 3.Seema Guha, “China claims Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Chinese territory’,” DNA, 13 November 2006, athttp://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200509/07/eng20050907_207149.html.http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_china-claims-arunachal-pradesh-as-c...
  4. 4.Out of this loan, $ 60 million was to be spent on a flood control project in Arunachal Pradesh.
  5. 5.John Chan, “China-India border talks highlight rising tensions,” 15 August 2009, at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/aug2009/indi-a15.shtml.
  6. 6.Sanjoy Majumder, “Frontier town venerates Dalai Lama,” BBC News, 10 November 2009, athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8351813.stm. In fact, Majumdar opined that India was showing, by allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang, that it was not averse to playing mind-games with China. His interpretation indicates how confident India was seen during this diplomatic tiff in the international media.
  7. 7.“Govt says Arunachal integral part of India after Chinese protest,” Times of India, 13 October 2009, athttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-says-Arunachal-integral-pa....
  8. 8.“As Tezpur Corps commander, Jaswal visited China in 2008,” Indian Express, 28 August 2010, athttp://www.indianexpress.com/news/as-tezpur-corps-commander-jaswal-visit....
  9. 9.Manjeet S. Pardesi (2010), “Understanding (Changing) Chinese Strategic Perceptions of India,” Strategic Analysis, 34 (4): 562-578.
  10. 10.Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan’s article “Understanding China’s Military Strategy” published in Strategic Analysis, 32 (6), November 2008 provides a very crisp analysis of Chinese military strategic understanding of India, the US and Japan. Manjeet S. Pardesi in his article “Understanding (Changing) Chinese Strategic Perceptions of India” analyses Chinese perceptions of “the so-called ‘quadrilateral alliance’ of Asia-Pacific democracies – the US, Japan, Australia and India.”

Saturday, July 17, 2010

PGDCJ Workshop On Fundamentals of Video Production on 17,18&24 July 21010

 Workshop On Fundamentals of Video Production on 17,18&24 July 21010 at Institute of Distance education, University of Kerala

PGDCJ Workshop On Fundamentals of Video Production on 17,18&24 July 21010

Monday, June 14, 2010

India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials

Read the summary of the Interesting weekly seminar Presented at IDSA, New Delhi by Rajaram Panda
Chairperson: V. P. Dutt
External Discussants: Amb. Rajiv Sikri & Amb. T.C.A. Rangachari
Internal Discussants: Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya and Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan
Dr. Rajaram Panda presented his paper titled India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials on Friday, April 16, 2010. The paper’s main focus was on maritime cooperation between India and Japan and more specifically on the strategic dimensions of this cooperation. Dr. Panda argued that the looming Chinese shadow is the rationale behind this cooperation. First, he defined what a ‘strategic partnership’ means, arguing that the canvas of a “strategic relationship” was much larger than mere “political relationship”. A strategic partnership includes “defence, economic, and security dimensions in the relationship.”
Dr. Panda emphasized that there was a great convergence of interests between India and Japan in the maritime domain. He highlighted India’s unique geographical position, which makes its cooperation extremely critical for Japan in securing its sea lanes. Much of Japan’s international trade is dependent upon safety of its sea lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. He argued that security of Japan’s maritime and energy supplies prominently figured in its security calculus.
Dr. Panda discussed two high-level important visits in detail: the first being Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s visit to Japan, and the other Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit to India, which he characterized as a landmark visit. During this visit, an Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation Based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was adopted. This plan delineated a host of issue-areas in which a meaningful strategic partnership could be built. However, he highlighted the Japanese stand on India’s nuclear programme as a major irritant in what is an otherwise cordial relationship.

Discussion

Amb. Rajiv Sikri argued that the economic aspect of the strategic partnership should be part of this paper. He further argued that the China factor was an important factor shaping this strategic partnership, but it was not the only factor. There are other important factors also which require due focus. Besides, the importance of China factor will keep varying depending upon who is in power in Japan. The India-Japan relationship is not that undifferentiated as it is being considered. There are more nuances involved in it. He was of the view that the US-Japan alliance had not outlived its utility and should not be underestimated. As to the definition of strategic partnership, he said that India had very loose definition of the partnership. He further argued that a strategic partnership basically meant macro-level understanding, not micro. It should be dealt with on that level only. On the question of Japanese investment in India, he said that Japanese businessmen should understand how business was done in India. He argued that there was no point in Japanese businessmen constantly complaining about India’s business environment. They should follow the example of Korean businessmen and introspect how they have succeeded in India.
Amb. T.C.A. Rangachari raised some fundamental questions. He asked: if Japan was considered to be a declining power then why there was a need for an India-Japan strategic partnership. Similarly, why have a strategic partnership with the United States if it is actually declining. If the argument behind these strategic partnerships is a rising China then one must ask as to why China would not be a responsible power. Expressing doubts about China’s rise as a responsible power reflects the influence of Western thinking. He also said that the sea lanes had never been disrupted since World War II, thus, the security of sea lanes is not the biggest issue. He argued that we should not be uncritical of Western wisdom, which had actually projected India as a maritime threat in the 1970s. He further argued that the strategic partnership between India and Japan was ambivalent and Japanese perception of India was changing very slowly. Incidentally, he said that there was a minority view in Japan that favoured India’s nuclear programme.
Brigadier Rumel Dahiya argued that the geostrategic importance of Japan must be assessed while exploring any strategic partnership. Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan mentioned that the economic aspect needs to be probed more. He further argued that India-Japan defence cooperation has not been strong. He argued that we should also try to understand Japanese laws and constitution, which prevents Japan from participating in any collective security mechanism.
Concluding the discussion, Professor V.P. Dutt said that he felt that Japan’s new foreign policy was dubious, ambiguous and uncertain. He was of the opinion that Japanese leaders were making very vague statements about their foreign policy and they themselves may not be very clear as to what they want. He raised a larger philosophical point – the Japanese public seems to have lost interest in foreign affairs. Now, the question is whether Japan will remain confused or it will become even more confused.
Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Assistant, IDSA

Tuesday, June 01, 2010

Executive Accountability to Legislature in the Foreign Policy Making: The Case of India and USA



The problem of the control of foreign policy has been a perennial source of anguish for democracies. If Parliament is the premier representative institution through which the sovereignty of the people is given concrete expression, nowhere has that sovereignty been more at risk in recent times than in the matter of signing international treaties and incurring international obligations. As India increasingly integrates into the global order by signing treaties, joining more multilateral institutions with sanction-binding power and entering into bilateral arrangements, it is becoming increasingly clear that Parliament’s role in incurring these international obligations is quite minimal. This is despite the fact that the Indian Constitution expressly places treaty-making powers within the jurisdiction of Parliament. India is a parliamentary democracy in which the executive must be responsible and answerable to the Parliament in all the ways. But regarding the foreign policy decisions of the country executive accountability to legislature is nebulous. At the same time in the US Presidential system the executive is not only answerable, but also needs ratification of the legislature, especially the Senate, in all foreign policy decisions of the country. This chapter is analysing the degree of executive accountability to legislature in the foreign policy making of India and USA


At the time of Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal the question of parliamentary control over executive in foreign policy making become a central point of debate in India. This context raised a serious question that if foreign policy becomes the property of the executive, what happens to democratic control? In our own times this issue has acquired special urgency due to increasing trans-national threats and the influence of various actors in the foreign policy making including multinational corporations. In addition to this certain contemporary factors like globalisation, increasing attention of the public and the decline of one party dominant system were also accelerated the significance of the role of parliament in foreign policy decision making.

a)      Globalisation of the country’s economy: Unlike in the past, foreign policy matters now are seen to affect the lives of citizens and are becoming electoral issues. In this regard, analysts point out how in the 1994 assembly elections, the then ruling Congress had to face poll reversals in the two southern states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. Among the reasons for the reversals, a noteworthy one was said to be the condition of the fishermen who had been badly affected following the central government's decision to allow multinational corporations into deep-sea fishing; this became an important electoral issue espoused by the opposition.

b)      Increasing attention of the public: Competing mass media will report all important developments related to foreign policy and it have a very great impact on the people. So today foreign policy achievements or failures can make or unmake a government. This belief, analysts point out, has become strong after I.K. Gujral became Prime Minister. It has been argued that Mr Gujral's significant success as a foreign minister in the past turned out to be the single most important point in his favour at the time of his selection  as a  United Front leader.

c)      Decline of One party dominant system: The consolidation of coalition politics in the country which has supplanted the 'one-party dominance' of the Congress accelerated the significance of parliament in foreign policy making. No longer can the government readily take Parliament for granted since it cannot count on an overwhelming majority there. The government of the day has to strive for consensus by taking into confidence all the major political parties. Here  Parliament, in the process, comes into its own as a deliberative body

Indian Constitution expressly places treaty-making powers within the jurisdiction of Parliament. In much traditional political theory that delineates the separation of powers between the legislature and executive, treaty-making powers were largely left to the discretion of the executive. The legal tradition that India inherited from the British, by and large, upheld this position. A famous decision of the Privy Council in the case of Attorney General for Canada versus Attorney General for Ontario in 1937 argued that “Parliament no doubt has constitutional control over the executive, but it cannot be disputed that the creation of obligations undertaken in treaties and the assent to their form and quality are functions of the executive alone”.  This judgement went on to say that once such obligations are created, they bind the state against other contracting parties, but Parliament may refuse to perform them and thus leave the state in default.

Indian Parliament and the Making of Foreign Policy

Under Article 246 of the Constitution, Parliament is given exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. This list includes items such as “entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementation of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries”. Thus, it is fairly obvious that treaty making is within the purview of Parliament and is not limited to the executive. But the de facto experience of entering into treaties since independence has left the matter solely to the executive. Parliament has not enacted any laws that regulate the manner in which the executive shall sign or ratify international treaties and covenants. Nor does Parliament decide the manner in which these treaties should be implemented, except in cases where such implementation requires Parliament to enact a law. Indeed, not only has Parliament not adopted any formal procedure for ratification, it has also explicitly rejected the requirement that treaties be ratified. As early as 1960, the speaker of the Lok Sabha declared:

A number of treaties have been entered into so far, and they have not been brought up for ratification here. It does not prevent the government from bringing up any particular treaty for ratification before signing it, but it is not obligatory to do so”.

There have been intermittent attempts to formally bind the executive to a ratification procedure. In 1993, then Minister of Defence George Fernandez introduced a bill to amend Article 253 of the Constitution stipulating that treaties and conventions be ratified by not less than half of the membership of each house of Parliament and by the legislatures of not less than half of the states. During the 1990s, two other private members’ bills were introduced to this effect. Unfortunately, like Fernandes’ bill, they were not even brought up for consideration.
As far as we can determine, during the last two decades Parliament has only once debated whether it should legally ratify treaties. This was a debate conducted in the Rajya Sabha in response to a private member’s bill introduced by M.A. Baby, in light of several WTO-related agreements signed by the government. The overwhelming sentiment of the house was that such ratification was unnecessary and would potentially lead to adverse consequences. In fact, in one of the longest speeches during the debate, Pranab Mukherjee argued more or less that if Parliament were obliged to ratify treaties, many treaties that had been of enormous benefit to India would not have been signed. Thus, historically there has been widespread sentiment that politicising the signing of international treaties by subjecting them to a ratification procedure would weaken India’s position rather than strengthen it. It could be argued the fact that Parliament has not taken an active role in monitoring the executive on the matter of international treaties does not imply that the executive has been given a free hand by the legislature. In a parliamentary system with a party government, presumably no government will enter into treaties that do not have significant support within their own parties, and by implication, among the legislators. In principle, this political dynamic should function. In practice, it appears that political parties, even of the government in power, are not widely consulted. There is a great deal of secrecy surrounding international negotiations and members of most political parties admit that they learn of international treaties only after the fact.
It has also generally been the case that many treaties of importance are brought to the attention of Parliament, but the government does not make a decision unless the sentiments of Parliament are clear on the matter. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has often been debated in Parliament and successive governments have used their assessment of parliamentary sentiment on the matter not to sign the treaty. The other side of the story is the WTO treaties signed in 1994 on which there was relatively little prior discussion in Parliament as a whole. The interesting analytical puzzle is this: Would a formal ratification procedure strengthen India’s hand in international negotiations? Answer to this question is that a formal ratification procedure will strengthen the bargaining power of the state. The American government uses the argument that a treaty will have to be ratified by the United States Congress as a bargaining tool. In the Indian case there is very little evidence that Parliament and the executive have strategically joined hands to strengthen India’s bargaining position.

Another reason for not being too alarmed at the lack of parliamentary oversight of treaties is that most international agreements and treaties can be made effective only by incorporating them into domestic legislation. For example, a treaty that entails ceding territory would require amending the Constitution. But other treaties require incorporation into the national legal system via legislation approved by Parliament—for instance, many of the provisions that accrue from joining the WTO. It could be argued that even if Parliament did not have a role in signing a treaty, it would exercise its sovereign authority to decide whether or not an obligation stemming from an international agreement would become Indian law. Theoretically speaking, Parliament can, at that stage, refuse to incorporate the provisions of a treaty into domestic law and render the treaty ineffective. After all, the TRIPS agreements required that India’s domestic patent laws be modified and the 1970 Patents Act be amended. The attempt to change India’s patent law failed to pass muster in 1995, although it succeeded in doing so later. But, as the argument goes, the very fact that treaties require corresponding domestic legislation means that the authority of Parliament cannot be by-passed.

In principle, this argument has merits, but in practice, a treaty already signed is something of a fait accompli. It is true that Parliament refused on many occasions to incorporate the requirements of WTO-related agreements into domestic law; it is also equally true that it did so just before the provisions of these treaties were to be enforced. In fact, the whole tenor of Parliament’s posture on the TRIPS agreement, for example, was against the provisions of the treaty—at least in public—until as late as 1997. The story of TRIPS-related legislation in India is sobering. The draft provisions of the TRIPS agreement ran counter to India’s official negotiating position as outlined in a background paper submitted by a negotiating committee in 1989. The government then decided to refer the matter to a parliamentary standing committee of the Ministry of Commerce consisting of 40 MPs drawn from all political parties. In 1993, the standing committee submitted a report that vehemently opposed most of the provisions and stipulations of the draft legislation. It was, for instance, opposed to granting product patents, granting patents for 20 years and various conditions attached to the transition period for developing countries. But despite such overwhelming scepticism from the parliamentary standing committee, the government signed the TRIPS agreement without again consulting the committee or even Parliament itself.

For the subject under discussion, the substantive merits or demerits of the TRIPS agreement are beside the point. The crucial point is that the government signed a major agreement disregarding the recommendations of a parliamentary standing committee. This raises two questions. First, what is the point of such standing committees if their deliberations have no impact on the government and do not compel it to seek wider parliamentary consultation? Second, the government signed the TRIPS agreement despite the prevailing parliamentary sentiment against it at the time.

The fact of the matter is that the impact of international treaties on domestic policy is vastly increasing in both scale and scope. It is manifestly the case that many of the international treaties that India has signed during the last decade have profound ramifications not only for economic policy, but also for the structure of the Indian polity as well. Let us take one example. Under the Indian system of federalism, certain items are placed within the jurisdiction of the state government, some within the jurisdiction of the Central government, and some are on a concurrent list. Notwithstanding this separation of jurisdictions, Parliament, under Article 253 of the Constitution has the power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any country or countries or any decision made at an international conference, associated or other body.

This provision, if extended to all domains, has the odd effect of effectively allowing the provisions of an international treaty to trump the basic architecture of the Constitution. For instance, under the allocation of subjects in the Constitution, agriculture is considered a state subject. A case can be made that India’s signing of the agriculture-related provisions of the WTO not only has an impact on Indian economic policy, but also transforms the nature of Indian federalism. In effect, crucial parts of agricultural policy, a matter left to the states by the Constitution, is now being determined by international agreements that have not been discussed, let alone authorized, by state legislatures. The point is that the lack of parliamentary involvement in formulating, authorizing and ratifying international treaties may also diminish its capacity to define the terms of Indian federalism.

The Case of USA

Regarding the United States, no treaty that a president signs with his counterparts in the world can come into force unless the American Senate upholds it. Even closer to home, Nepal and Bangladesh have similar provisions in their Constitutions. Subject to the advice and consent role of the U.S. Senate, the President of the United States negotiates treaties with foreign nations, but treaties enter into force only if ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. The US has signed the CTBT, but not ratified it. On 13 October 1999, the United States Senate rejected ratification of the CTBT. President Barack Obama stated during his 2008 election campaign that "As president, I will reach out to the Senate to secure the ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date."  The President is also Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces, and as such has broad authority over the armed forces; however only Congress has authority to declare war, and the civilian and military budget is written by the Congress. The United States Secretary of State is the Foreign Minister of the United States and is the primary conductor of state-to-state diplomacy. Both the Secretary of State and ambassadors are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Congress also has power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.

In the United States, the term treaty is used in a more restricted legal sense than in international law. U.S. law distinguishes what it calls treaties, which are derived from the Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution, from Congressional-Executive Agreements and Executive Agreements. All three classes are considered treaties under international law; they are distinct only from the perspective of internal United States law.The distinctions are primarily concerning their method of ratification (by 2/3rds of the Senate, by normal legislative process, or by the President alone) and their relationship to domestic law. Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution grants power to the President to make treaties with the "advice and consent" of two-thirds of the Senate. This is different from normal legislation which requires approval by simple majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. However, throughout U.S. history, the President has also made "international agreements" through Congressional-Executive Agreements that are ratified with only a majority from both houses of Congress, or sole-Executive Agreements made by the President alone. Though the constitution does not expressly provide for any alternative procedure and although some noted constitutional scholars, such as Laurence Tribe, believe that Congressional-Executive Agreements are unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of the United States has considered these agreements to be valid, and that any disagreements are a political question for the executive and legislative branches to work out amongst themselves. In addition, U.S. law distinguishes between self-executing treaties, which do not require additional legislative action, and non-self-executing treaties which do require the enactment of new laws.

The United States takes a different view from many other nations concerning the relationship between international and domestic law. Unlike nations that view international treaties and statutes as always superseding domestic law, international agreements instead are incorporated into the body of U.S. federal law. In Reid v. Covert, the US Supreme Court specified that any international agreement inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution is void under domestic law - the same as any other federal law in conflict with the Constitution - and while the Supreme Court could potentially rule a treaty provision to be unconstitutional and void under domestic law, it has never done so.
Conclusion
Multilateral agreements, global accords and international covenants will increasingly rely on treaties and treaty making to bring about changes that will directly or indirectly affect millions of people around the world. Such treaties obliterate the distinction between domestic and foreign policy. Much of parliamentary deference to the executive on treaties has its origins in an environment where the distinction between domestic and foreign policy could, to a certain degree, be maintained. In a changed environment, where international agreements determine the range of policy choices on issues from agriculture and tariffs to the structure of property rights, Parliament can maintain an important legislative role only if it is an effective part of the treaty-making process. The process of formulating and signing international treaties is posing a significant challenge to all representative institutions. Parliaments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are all debating procedures to democratize treaty negotiations in a manner that does not entirely by-pass Parliament. Admittedly, as most parliamentarians in India acknowledge, subjecting treaties to parliamentary supervision is not an easy task. This makes international negotiations more complex and potentially endless as Parliament must have the institutional and infrastructural capacities to participate in such a process, and often its interests lie in not democratizing the treaty-making process. Treaties can, after all, give parliaments cover to push through legislation in the face of political deadlock. But Parliament cannot avoid the thorny question of disciplining international treaty making by the executive. It will have to consider issues such as: How does Parliament make treaty making subject to accountability? How does Parliament create clear norms that require prior consultation with Parliament on particular classes of treaties? Should Parliament legislate something for a formal ratification proposal? Parliament’s viability as a key decision-making body will depend upon finding some procedures that address these concerns.
B.R. Ambedkar, generally acknowledged to be the father of the Indian Constitution, had warned the Constituent Assembly:
I feel, however, good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work, happen to be a bad lot...The working of the Constitution does not depend wholly upon the nature of the Constitution. The Constitution can provide only the organs of state such as the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The factors on which the working of those organs of the state depends are the people and the political parties they will set up as their instruments to carry out their wishes and their politics. Who can say how the people of India and their parties will behave?
And in that observation lies the future of India’s Parliament
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