INDIA AND US: FROM ESTRANGEMENT TO ENGAGEMENT
(Anil Kumar P*)
The end of the cold war freed India-US relations from the constraints of global bipolarity, but interactions continued for a decade to be affected by the burden of history, most notably the longstanding India- Pakistan rivalry and nuclear weapons proliferation in the region. Recent years, however have witnessed a sea change in bilateral relations, with more positive interactions becoming the norm. India’s swift offer of full support for US led counter terrorism operations after September11, 2001 was widely viewed as a reflective of such change. The recent agreement titled New Frame work for the US-India Defense Relationship signed by our Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee on June 28, 2005 and the joint statement issued by the two countries during the time of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to US tell us the fact that India-US relations are ‘transforming and forging a strategic partnership’
A number of independent developments carrying together have created the climate for the transformation of our ties. To begin with, the end of cold war and the consequent rearrangement of interstate ties allowed both India and the US to revisit their relationship and redefine it to address contemporary opportunities and challenges.
Second, this exercise in reassessment would not have had the same value and results if India had remained economically stagnant. Instead, fifteen years of reform and a growing integration with global process has made India a dynamic force with still greater potential for the future. United States looks at enormous economic profits. India has a population of more than 1 billion, which means a big market. India has already become the third largest economy in Asia after Japan and China. It is believed that cooperation with India in the economic field is of vital importance for the United States to maintain it’s superpower status(Zhang Lijun 2005: p-12)
Third, the “China factor” is a strong boost to US- India relations. A US think-tank Carnege Endowment for International Peace , recently issued a report on the US agenda with regard to the rising power of India namely India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States. This report pointed out that considering India will possess a potential developing ability in the next 20 to 25 years, the Bush administration should help the country become an Asian super power that could counterbalance China[1].
The more pressing issues also contributed to clearer understanding of our shared interests. Global threats today emanate from nation states bent on aggrandisement and more from trans-national non-state actors. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction(WMD) proliferation, pandemics, natural disaster and illegal narcotics are some examples of problems that can only be addressed through greater global cooperation. No single state, however strong, can bear global burden alone. Naturally in forging new partnerships, countries that share common values and now perceive common interests as well would come together. Finally the image of India in the United States has undergone a radical change, associated as it is with a successful and professionally prominent Indian community. Similarly, the opening of the Indian economy also encouraged India’s civil society to expand its interactions with the United States.
India and US Since 1982:From Estranged to Engaged Democracies
It is worth noting that the ‘transformation’ in India- US relations emerged from a fairly long process. The origin can be traced clearly back to Indira Gandhi’s interest in a more constructive and flexible relationship with Washington as early as 1982. She had an eye to India’s economic development and its access to sorely needed technology to modernize Indian production(Kanti Bajpai 2005:p.3577). After her death, Rajiv Gandhi took the process forward. His state visit to the US in 1985 resulted in a greater defense cooperation between the two and in particular the sale of defense equipments(Kanti Bajpai 2005:p3577).With the end of cold war, it was Nara Simha Rao who took the next major steps towards a close relationship with the US. His concerns were primarily economic in the wake of India’s financial crisis of 1990-‘91. Fall of Soviet Union also accelerated the process. But the links were broken at the time when India conducted its nuclear tests in 1998. The next milestone in India-US relationship was the Jaswant Singh Strobe Talbot talks that were held from 1999-2001.
When George W Bush came to power in January 2001, among the strategic statements he made was that he sought a much closer relationship with India. He extolled India’s democracy and publicly declared his administrations interest in cultivating India. It was no secret that he and his security advisers regarded China as a possible counterweight. The NDA government responded with enthusiasm. Perhaps the clearest expression of the Indian governments interest in a new relationship was its support to the Bush administrations controversial decision to build missile defense and its hope that India would be partner in missile defense initiative. India’s turn towards Washington increased dramatically after the events of September 11, 2001. the NDA government immediately offered the US virtually any military help it might require in responding to the attacks on the American mainland.
This brief survey of India-US relations reveals the following things.
· First, as noted earlier, India and US have been engaged in a fitful but rather steady rapprochement for over two decades interrupted only briefly by the nuclear tests of 1998.
· Second, on both the Indian and US side. In India, each of the three major formations- the Congress, the BJP and the Third Front have been involved in deepening the engagement.
· Third, every Indian government has tried to work with the US on nuclear matters.
· Fourth, stronger military-to-military links has been pursued by every Indian government since Narasimha Rao. After september11, 2001 these links have included regular intelligence sharing, particularly in respect of terrorism
Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)
George W. Bush resolved, prior to assuming his office in January 2001 that his administration would alter the character of this important bilateral relationship in order to permanently entrench the large, vibrant and successful democracy that is India in the ranks of US friends and allies. In Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s Prime Minister at that time, Bush found a perfect partner- statesman, who equally weary of a history of US-Indian antagonism and strongly inclined to regard the United States and India as “natural allies”[2]. From 2001-2003, the courtship between the United States and India grew in ardor and expectations. Thanks to a series of breakthroughs in bilateral, diplomatic collaborations. This paved the way for Bush administration’s major first- term diplomatic achievement- Next Step in Strategic Partnership(NSSP). This agreement, which was announced in January 2004, drew its inspiration from the Bush –Vajpayee joint statement of November 2001[3]. NSSP was heralded as a breakthrough in US -Indian strategic collaboration. Since 2001, the Indian government has pressed the United States to ease restrictions on the export to India of dual-use-high technology goods, as well as to increase in civilian nuclear and space cooperation. These three key issues came to be known as the trinity and top Indian officials stated that progress in these areas was necessary to provide tangible evidences of a changed US- India relationship(K Alan Kranstadt 2005:p14.). There were later reference to a “quartet” when the issue of missile defense was included. In late 2003, Secretary of State Powell asserted that progress was being made on the “glide path” towards agreement on the “trinity” issues. NSSP declared in January 2004, indicating that the US-India “Strategic Partnership” includes expanding cooperation in these areas as well as expanding dialogue on Missile Defense. But some nongovernmental US experts believe that although India is not regarded as a proliferators of sensitive technologies, US obligations under existing law may limit significantly the scope of NSSP engagement. (K Alan Kranstadt 2005:p14.).
The New Frame Work
In June, 2005 US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and visiting Indian Defense Minister Pranab Muakherjee singed a ten year India-US military cooperation agreement namely New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship. The new frame work defines some key political principles agreed on by both sides, a set of common interest , a plan of action, and an institutional frame work to advance those interests. In the service of these interests, the two countries pledge to implement 13 measures, these measures are rendered in a long list in the agreement, but they can be arrange in four areas of what we could called capacity building.
Cognitive capacity building
· Conduct exchanges on defense strategy and defense transformation
· Increase in flow of intelligence information
· Deepen security discussion between the two sides
Hardware capacity building
· Expand defense trade between India and the US
· Increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, cooperation and research and development.
· Expand missile defense collaboration
Capacity building in bilateral security.
· Joint and combined exercise and exchanges
· Strengthen their military capabilities in respect of security and terrorism.
· Improve capacities to deal with proliferation
· Improve the responses of their militaries to disaster situations.
Capacity building for multilateral security.
· Cooperate in multi national operations
· Interact with third countries to ensure regional and global peace.
· Help to build peace keeping capacities world wide.
Finally the document outlines the institutional architecture within which they will cooperate more intensively. This includes the continuation of the Defense Policy Group(DPG) and the establishment of a Defense Procurement and Production Group and a Defense Joint Working Group. The DPG is the “primary mechanism to guide the US-India strategic defense relationship”. The Procurement and Production group will “oversee defense trade, as well as prospects for co production and technology collaboration”. The Joint Working Group will serve as a review committee which will measure progress in the various groups and subgroups twice a year.
The Nuclear Deal.
The recent Indo-US nuclear deal is a remarkable progress in India-US relationship. As part of the nuclear deal with the US, India has agreed to identify and separate all civilian and military nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguard regime[4]. The successful implementation of the deal would depend on how the US view India’s plan for separation of facilities as well as its commitment to compliance with an additional protocol. Recently, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made the reassuring statement that work on separating India’s civilian military nuclear facilities was at a fairly advanced stage(Ashwin Kumar2005:p-5530).Since 1978, US law requires that US nuclear exports to states that were not NPT recognised nuclear weapon states could not be authorised unless they have full scope of safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities(Ashwin Kumar 2005:p-5530). India is a non Nuclear Weapon State under the NPT and also according to US law, and therefore this condition applies to it. To accomplish the goals mentioned in the deal, India needs to place all its nuclear facilities not directly associated with nuclear weapons production or deployment under safeguards. India has many civil nuclear facilities in this category (David Albright and Susan Basu 2005:p-1). What ever the nature of safeguard agreements implemented between India and the IAEA, they would not be full scope since India would continue to refrain unsafe guarded military facilities. Therefore, Nuclear cooperation on a continued basis would require changes to US laws (Ashwin Kumar 2005:p-5530). Critics argued that in order to realise the deal between India and US, a long way to go ahead.
Energy Security
The countries existing annual – crude oil production is peaked at about 32 million tonnes as against the current peak demand of about 110 million tonne. With inadequate crude production, the country is heavily dependent on imports. In the current scenario, India’s oil consumption by end of 2007 is expected to reach 136 million tonne (MT), of which domestic production will be only around 34 MT. India will have to pay an oil bill roughly 50 billion, assuming a weighted average price of $50 per barrel of crude. In 2003-’04 against total expert of $64 billion, oil imports accounted for $21 billion. If net invisible receipts are also included, then against a total receipt of around $90 billion, India paid out 23.33 percent of the receipts for import of petroleum crude and products. This is a crucial situation. Thanks to the present nuclear agreement between India TVS has a larger energy rationale, that should not be overlooked. Our foreign secretary stated that, “you must bear in mind that India and US are engaging not just on one element of the energy mix, we are exploring on clean coal technologies, on exploitation of coal-bed methane and gas hydrates, as carbon sequestration and on the hydrogen economy. To believe that civil nuclear energy is unimportant because it constitutes only 3% of India’s current energy production betrays a lack of understanding of our energy requirements and their emission implications. Civil nuclear energy currently limited precisely because of technology denial. If freed from current restrictions, there is little doubt that it will rapidly move into percentage of double digits. India is today partnering the US almost every international initiative on various aspects of energy. The US is contributing to our economic growth and we too are bringing our technology skills to the table. Our collaboration can help ease the growing pressures on the global energy market, where oil consumption has gone up four-fold over the last century. In most areas, market forces are driving transactions, but regulatory restrictions are blocking normal commerce in civil nuclear energy and must be addressed if India is to be a long-term partner. Ironically, continued technology denial targets the very reform-minded and forward thinking constituency in India that is in forefront of advocating a closer Indo-US partnership.
Conclusion
The texture and content of the present Indo-US exchanges are indicative of a constructive and robust bilateral engagement, potentially directed towards partnership-building based on “increasingly overlapping national interests”. The priority shift from non-proliferation to trade and commerce, terrorism, energy, security, regional security and stability and producting democracy, has helped to bridge the gap between the world’s largest and oldest democracies.
The equation between key officials in the present UPA government audits counterparts in the Bush Administration will be crucial in maintaining the direction momentum of India-US ties and forging ahead with a more robust relationship. Although the replacement of Colin Powell by Cardoleeza Rice as the US Secretary of State indicates the possibility of better bilateral ties given her stance on India.[5] In areas like Trade & Commerce, Counter-terrorism, energy, security, information technology etc. the interests of US and India is converging. India’s growth in the economic field and “China Cord” of US is boosting India-US relationship in an unconventional manner.
Considering the new stakes involved in the recently transformed relations and the prevailing atmosphere of prudence, neither country would be willing to jeopardize their new-found relationship. However, commitment and sensitivity towards each other’s national security interests will go a long way in concretizing and giving a definitive shape to this relationship.
* Anil Kumar P is a Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science, University of Kerala, Kariavattom Campus, Thiruvananthapuram. anil.sopanam@yahoo.com , anilanchal@gmail.com
Notes
[1] “ India As a New Global Powere: An Action Agenda for the United States” was a report published by Carnage Endowment for International Peace-a think tank in Washington DC. Author of the report is Ashley J Tellis and published in March 2005.
[2] “India, USA and the World”, Remarks by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the Asia Society, New York, September 28, 1998, available at www.asiasociety.org/speches/vajpayee.html.
[3] “ Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of India”, November 9,2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011109-10.html
[4] Joint Statement between President George W Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, office of the President, see the whitehouse, July18, 2005
[5] As the main foreign policy advisor to George W. Bush Jr. in the 2000 Presidential Campaign, Condoleezza Rice argued in an article published in Foreign Affairs that the “US should pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually in the US to connect India with Pakistan and to think only to Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.” Quoted in C. Raja Mohan, “For New Delhi, It is as Good as it Gets: Rice as Secy of State”, The Indian Express, November 17, 2004; Chidananda Rajghatta, “Rice Good on India’s Plate”, The Times of India, November 16, 2004.
References
§ Michael Mastandune. September 2005. “US Foreign Policy and Pragmatic Use of International Institutions”. Asian Journal of International Affairs: 59(3).
§ Zhang Lijun. 2005. “Are the US and India Partners Again”. Beijing Review. 48 (31).
§ Sidharth Varada Rajan. 2005. “US Non-Proliferation group ups the ante with draft separation Plan, The Hindu, Dec. 21.
§ Kanti Bajpai. 2005. “Where are India and the US Heading”. Economic and Political Weekly. XL (32).
§ Achin Vanaik. 2005. “Significance of Framework Agreement on Defence”. Economic and Political Weekly. XL (32).
§ Varghese Koithara. 2005. India-US Defense Co-operation, Expectations and Prospects”.
§ Sukumar Muralidharan 2005. “Partnership and its Discontents”. Economic and Political Weekly. XL (32).
§ Ashwin Kumar. 2005. “Indo-US Nuclear Deal”. Economic and Political Weekly. XL (53).
§ Douglas Jehl. 2005. “Bush had Saudi, Pak in evil lisk: Book”. The New Indian Express. TVM. October 14.
§ Venu Rajamany. 2002. India-China-US Triangle: A Soft Balance of Power System in the Making. CSIS available in www.csis.org/saprog/venu.pdf.
§ Babini Mishra. 2005. “India-US Relations”: A Paradigm Shift”, Strategic Analysis, 29(1) IDSA. New Delhi.
§ David Albrigh and Susan Basu. 2005. Separating Indian Military and Civilian Nuclear Facilities” – a report published by Institute of Science and International Security, Washington DC.
§ Ashey J. Tellis. 2005. “India as a New Global Power” a report published by Carnege Endowment for International Peace. Washington DC. available from http://www.carnegeendourment.org/file/Telli-India.globalpowerfinal.pdf.
§ Shyam Shran. 2005. “Transforming India-US Relations: Building a Strategic Partnership” A talk in carnage endowment for international peace available from www.carnegeendowment.org.
§ G. Balachandran. 2005. “Indo-US Relation A Paradigm Shift”. Strategic Analysis. 29(2). IDSA. New Delhi.
§ Shelley Vishwajeet. 2005. “Oil Slick”, The New Indian Express, January 31.
§ K. Alan Kronstadt. 2005. India-US Relations. CRS Issue Brief for Congress – Congressional Research Service. No.IB93097 available from the website of Congressional Research Service.
(Anil Kumar P*)
The end of the cold war freed India-US relations from the constraints of global bipolarity, but interactions continued for a decade to be affected by the burden of history, most notably the longstanding India- Pakistan rivalry and nuclear weapons proliferation in the region. Recent years, however have witnessed a sea change in bilateral relations, with more positive interactions becoming the norm. India’s swift offer of full support for US led counter terrorism operations after September11, 2001 was widely viewed as a reflective of such change. The recent agreement titled New Frame work for the US-India Defense Relationship signed by our Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee on June 28, 2005 and the joint statement issued by the two countries during the time of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to US tell us the fact that India-US relations are ‘transforming and forging a strategic partnership’
A number of independent developments carrying together have created the climate for the transformation of our ties. To begin with, the end of cold war and the consequent rearrangement of interstate ties allowed both India and the US to revisit their relationship and redefine it to address contemporary opportunities and challenges.
Second, this exercise in reassessment would not have had the same value and results if India had remained economically stagnant. Instead, fifteen years of reform and a growing integration with global process has made India a dynamic force with still greater potential for the future. United States looks at enormous economic profits. India has a population of more than 1 billion, which means a big market. India has already become the third largest economy in Asia after Japan and China. It is believed that cooperation with India in the economic field is of vital importance for the United States to maintain it’s superpower status(Zhang Lijun 2005: p-12)
Third, the “China factor” is a strong boost to US- India relations. A US think-tank Carnege Endowment for International Peace , recently issued a report on the US agenda with regard to the rising power of India namely India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States. This report pointed out that considering India will possess a potential developing ability in the next 20 to 25 years, the Bush administration should help the country become an Asian super power that could counterbalance China[1].
The more pressing issues also contributed to clearer understanding of our shared interests. Global threats today emanate from nation states bent on aggrandisement and more from trans-national non-state actors. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction(WMD) proliferation, pandemics, natural disaster and illegal narcotics are some examples of problems that can only be addressed through greater global cooperation. No single state, however strong, can bear global burden alone. Naturally in forging new partnerships, countries that share common values and now perceive common interests as well would come together. Finally the image of India in the United States has undergone a radical change, associated as it is with a successful and professionally prominent Indian community. Similarly, the opening of the Indian economy also encouraged India’s civil society to expand its interactions with the United States.
India and US Since 1982:From Estranged to Engaged Democracies
It is worth noting that the ‘transformation’ in India- US relations emerged from a fairly long process. The origin can be traced clearly back to Indira Gandhi’s interest in a more constructive and flexible relationship with Washington as early as 1982. She had an eye to India’s economic development and its access to sorely needed technology to modernize Indian production(Kanti Bajpai 2005:p.3577). After her death, Rajiv Gandhi took the process forward. His state visit to the US in 1985 resulted in a greater defense cooperation between the two and in particular the sale of defense equipments(Kanti Bajpai 2005:p3577).With the end of cold war, it was Nara Simha Rao who took the next major steps towards a close relationship with the US. His concerns were primarily economic in the wake of India’s financial crisis of 1990-‘91. Fall of Soviet Union also accelerated the process. But the links were broken at the time when India conducted its nuclear tests in 1998. The next milestone in India-US relationship was the Jaswant Singh Strobe Talbot talks that were held from 1999-2001.
When George W Bush came to power in January 2001, among the strategic statements he made was that he sought a much closer relationship with India. He extolled India’s democracy and publicly declared his administrations interest in cultivating India. It was no secret that he and his security advisers regarded China as a possible counterweight. The NDA government responded with enthusiasm. Perhaps the clearest expression of the Indian governments interest in a new relationship was its support to the Bush administrations controversial decision to build missile defense and its hope that India would be partner in missile defense initiative. India’s turn towards Washington increased dramatically after the events of September 11, 2001. the NDA government immediately offered the US virtually any military help it might require in responding to the attacks on the American mainland.
This brief survey of India-US relations reveals the following things.
· First, as noted earlier, India and US have been engaged in a fitful but rather steady rapprochement for over two decades interrupted only briefly by the nuclear tests of 1998.
· Second, on both the Indian and US side. In India, each of the three major formations- the Congress, the BJP and the Third Front have been involved in deepening the engagement.
· Third, every Indian government has tried to work with the US on nuclear matters.
· Fourth, stronger military-to-military links has been pursued by every Indian government since Narasimha Rao. After september11, 2001 these links have included regular intelligence sharing, particularly in respect of terrorism
Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)
George W. Bush resolved, prior to assuming his office in January 2001 that his administration would alter the character of this important bilateral relationship in order to permanently entrench the large, vibrant and successful democracy that is India in the ranks of US friends and allies. In Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s Prime Minister at that time, Bush found a perfect partner- statesman, who equally weary of a history of US-Indian antagonism and strongly inclined to regard the United States and India as “natural allies”[2]. From 2001-2003, the courtship between the United States and India grew in ardor and expectations. Thanks to a series of breakthroughs in bilateral, diplomatic collaborations. This paved the way for Bush administration’s major first- term diplomatic achievement- Next Step in Strategic Partnership(NSSP). This agreement, which was announced in January 2004, drew its inspiration from the Bush –Vajpayee joint statement of November 2001[3]. NSSP was heralded as a breakthrough in US -Indian strategic collaboration. Since 2001, the Indian government has pressed the United States to ease restrictions on the export to India of dual-use-high technology goods, as well as to increase in civilian nuclear and space cooperation. These three key issues came to be known as the trinity and top Indian officials stated that progress in these areas was necessary to provide tangible evidences of a changed US- India relationship(K Alan Kranstadt 2005:p14.). There were later reference to a “quartet” when the issue of missile defense was included. In late 2003, Secretary of State Powell asserted that progress was being made on the “glide path” towards agreement on the “trinity” issues. NSSP declared in January 2004, indicating that the US-India “Strategic Partnership” includes expanding cooperation in these areas as well as expanding dialogue on Missile Defense. But some nongovernmental US experts believe that although India is not regarded as a proliferators of sensitive technologies, US obligations under existing law may limit significantly the scope of NSSP engagement. (K Alan Kranstadt 2005:p14.).
The New Frame Work
In June, 2005 US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and visiting Indian Defense Minister Pranab Muakherjee singed a ten year India-US military cooperation agreement namely New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship. The new frame work defines some key political principles agreed on by both sides, a set of common interest , a plan of action, and an institutional frame work to advance those interests. In the service of these interests, the two countries pledge to implement 13 measures, these measures are rendered in a long list in the agreement, but they can be arrange in four areas of what we could called capacity building.
Cognitive capacity building
· Conduct exchanges on defense strategy and defense transformation
· Increase in flow of intelligence information
· Deepen security discussion between the two sides
Hardware capacity building
· Expand defense trade between India and the US
· Increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, cooperation and research and development.
· Expand missile defense collaboration
Capacity building in bilateral security.
· Joint and combined exercise and exchanges
· Strengthen their military capabilities in respect of security and terrorism.
· Improve capacities to deal with proliferation
· Improve the responses of their militaries to disaster situations.
Capacity building for multilateral security.
· Cooperate in multi national operations
· Interact with third countries to ensure regional and global peace.
· Help to build peace keeping capacities world wide.
Finally the document outlines the institutional architecture within which they will cooperate more intensively. This includes the continuation of the Defense Policy Group(DPG) and the establishment of a Defense Procurement and Production Group and a Defense Joint Working Group. The DPG is the “primary mechanism to guide the US-India strategic defense relationship”. The Procurement and Production group will “oversee defense trade, as well as prospects for co production and technology collaboration”. The Joint Working Group will serve as a review committee which will measure progress in the various groups and subgroups twice a year.
The Nuclear Deal.
The recent Indo-US nuclear deal is a remarkable progress in India-US relationship. As part of the nuclear deal with the US, India has agreed to identify and separate all civilian and military nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguard regime[4]. The successful implementation of the deal would depend on how the US view India’s plan for separation of facilities as well as its commitment to compliance with an additional protocol. Recently, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made the reassuring statement that work on separating India’s civilian military nuclear facilities was at a fairly advanced stage(Ashwin Kumar2005:p-5530).Since 1978, US law requires that US nuclear exports to states that were not NPT recognised nuclear weapon states could not be authorised unless they have full scope of safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities(Ashwin Kumar 2005:p-5530). India is a non Nuclear Weapon State under the NPT and also according to US law, and therefore this condition applies to it. To accomplish the goals mentioned in the deal, India needs to place all its nuclear facilities not directly associated with nuclear weapons production or deployment under safeguards. India has many civil nuclear facilities in this category (David Albright and Susan Basu 2005:p-1). What ever the nature of safeguard agreements implemented between India and the IAEA, they would not be full scope since India would continue to refrain unsafe guarded military facilities. Therefore, Nuclear cooperation on a continued basis would require changes to US laws (Ashwin Kumar 2005:p-5530). Critics argued that in order to realise the deal between India and US, a long way to go ahead.
Energy Security
The countries existing annual – crude oil production is peaked at about 32 million tonnes as against the current peak demand of about 110 million tonne. With inadequate crude production, the country is heavily dependent on imports. In the current scenario, India’s oil consumption by end of 2007 is expected to reach 136 million tonne (MT), of which domestic production will be only around 34 MT. India will have to pay an oil bill roughly 50 billion, assuming a weighted average price of $50 per barrel of crude. In 2003-’04 against total expert of $64 billion, oil imports accounted for $21 billion. If net invisible receipts are also included, then against a total receipt of around $90 billion, India paid out 23.33 percent of the receipts for import of petroleum crude and products. This is a crucial situation. Thanks to the present nuclear agreement between India TVS has a larger energy rationale, that should not be overlooked. Our foreign secretary stated that, “you must bear in mind that India and US are engaging not just on one element of the energy mix, we are exploring on clean coal technologies, on exploitation of coal-bed methane and gas hydrates, as carbon sequestration and on the hydrogen economy. To believe that civil nuclear energy is unimportant because it constitutes only 3% of India’s current energy production betrays a lack of understanding of our energy requirements and their emission implications. Civil nuclear energy currently limited precisely because of technology denial. If freed from current restrictions, there is little doubt that it will rapidly move into percentage of double digits. India is today partnering the US almost every international initiative on various aspects of energy. The US is contributing to our economic growth and we too are bringing our technology skills to the table. Our collaboration can help ease the growing pressures on the global energy market, where oil consumption has gone up four-fold over the last century. In most areas, market forces are driving transactions, but regulatory restrictions are blocking normal commerce in civil nuclear energy and must be addressed if India is to be a long-term partner. Ironically, continued technology denial targets the very reform-minded and forward thinking constituency in India that is in forefront of advocating a closer Indo-US partnership.
Conclusion
The texture and content of the present Indo-US exchanges are indicative of a constructive and robust bilateral engagement, potentially directed towards partnership-building based on “increasingly overlapping national interests”. The priority shift from non-proliferation to trade and commerce, terrorism, energy, security, regional security and stability and producting democracy, has helped to bridge the gap between the world’s largest and oldest democracies.
The equation between key officials in the present UPA government audits counterparts in the Bush Administration will be crucial in maintaining the direction momentum of India-US ties and forging ahead with a more robust relationship. Although the replacement of Colin Powell by Cardoleeza Rice as the US Secretary of State indicates the possibility of better bilateral ties given her stance on India.[5] In areas like Trade & Commerce, Counter-terrorism, energy, security, information technology etc. the interests of US and India is converging. India’s growth in the economic field and “China Cord” of US is boosting India-US relationship in an unconventional manner.
Considering the new stakes involved in the recently transformed relations and the prevailing atmosphere of prudence, neither country would be willing to jeopardize their new-found relationship. However, commitment and sensitivity towards each other’s national security interests will go a long way in concretizing and giving a definitive shape to this relationship.
* Anil Kumar P is a Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science, University of Kerala, Kariavattom Campus, Thiruvananthapuram. anil.sopanam@yahoo.com , anilanchal@gmail.com
Notes
[1] “ India As a New Global Powere: An Action Agenda for the United States” was a report published by Carnage Endowment for International Peace-a think tank in Washington DC. Author of the report is Ashley J Tellis and published in March 2005.
[2] “India, USA and the World”, Remarks by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the Asia Society, New York, September 28, 1998, available at www.asiasociety.org/speches/vajpayee.html.
[3] “ Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of India”, November 9,2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011109-10.html
[4] Joint Statement between President George W Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, office of the President, see the whitehouse, July18, 2005
[5] As the main foreign policy advisor to George W. Bush Jr. in the 2000 Presidential Campaign, Condoleezza Rice argued in an article published in Foreign Affairs that the “US should pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually in the US to connect India with Pakistan and to think only to Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.” Quoted in C. Raja Mohan, “For New Delhi, It is as Good as it Gets: Rice as Secy of State”, The Indian Express, November 17, 2004; Chidananda Rajghatta, “Rice Good on India’s Plate”, The Times of India, November 16, 2004.
References
§ Michael Mastandune. September 2005. “US Foreign Policy and Pragmatic Use of International Institutions”. Asian Journal of International Affairs: 59(3).
§ Zhang Lijun. 2005. “Are the US and India Partners Again”. Beijing Review. 48 (31).
§ Sidharth Varada Rajan. 2005. “US Non-Proliferation group ups the ante with draft separation Plan, The Hindu, Dec. 21.
§ Kanti Bajpai. 2005. “Where are India and the US Heading”. Economic and Political Weekly. XL (32).
§ Achin Vanaik. 2005. “Significance of Framework Agreement on Defence”. Economic and Political Weekly. XL (32).
§ Varghese Koithara. 2005. India-US Defense Co-operation, Expectations and Prospects”.
§ Sukumar Muralidharan 2005. “Partnership and its Discontents”. Economic and Political Weekly. XL (32).
§ Ashwin Kumar. 2005. “Indo-US Nuclear Deal”. Economic and Political Weekly. XL (53).
§ Douglas Jehl. 2005. “Bush had Saudi, Pak in evil lisk: Book”. The New Indian Express. TVM. October 14.
§ Venu Rajamany. 2002. India-China-US Triangle: A Soft Balance of Power System in the Making. CSIS available in www.csis.org/saprog/venu.pdf.
§ Babini Mishra. 2005. “India-US Relations”: A Paradigm Shift”, Strategic Analysis, 29(1) IDSA. New Delhi.
§ David Albrigh and Susan Basu. 2005. Separating Indian Military and Civilian Nuclear Facilities” – a report published by Institute of Science and International Security, Washington DC.
§ Ashey J. Tellis. 2005. “India as a New Global Power” a report published by Carnege Endowment for International Peace. Washington DC. available from http://www.carnegeendourment.org/file/Telli-India.globalpowerfinal.pdf.
§ Shyam Shran. 2005. “Transforming India-US Relations: Building a Strategic Partnership” A talk in carnage endowment for international peace available from www.carnegeendowment.org.
§ G. Balachandran. 2005. “Indo-US Relation A Paradigm Shift”. Strategic Analysis. 29(2). IDSA. New Delhi.
§ Shelley Vishwajeet. 2005. “Oil Slick”, The New Indian Express, January 31.
§ K. Alan Kronstadt. 2005. India-US Relations. CRS Issue Brief for Congress – Congressional Research Service. No.IB93097 available from the website of Congressional Research Service.
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