Media and Public Sphere in Kerala

The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfil this role requires systematic propaganda. The relationship between media, democracy and the public sphere has been the subject of intensive and increasing academic debate over the last few years in this context. The present paper is an attempt to analyse the changing function, role and involvement of media in the public sphere of Kerala, where the state is consumed more newspapers per capita than any other part of India.

Most contemporary conceptualisations of the public sphere are based on the ideas expressed in Jürgen Habermas' book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere – An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Public Sphere encompasses a variety of meanings and it implies a spatial concept, the social sites or arenas where meanings are articulated, distributed, and negotiated, as well as the collective body constituted by, and in this process, "the public". Public sphere is considered as a corrective against the oppressive state, a curative of the irrationalities of civil society and a deterrent to the exploitative market. Jurgun Habermas (1989) remarks that public sphere can ensure undistorted communication evolving critical public opinion. According to Kellner (2007), public sphere is an arena closely linked to the organic life world in which people would be able to discuss public issues in an egalitarian and non-instrumental manner.

While dealing with public sphere propaganda model theory is apt in the context of Kerala. The propaganda model is a theory advanced by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky that alleges systemic biases in the mass media and seeks to explain them in terms of structural economic causes.(Systemic bias is the inherent tendency of a process to favour particular outcomes). First presented in their 1988 book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, the "Propaganda model" views the private media as businesses interested in the sale of a product — readers and audiences — to other businesses (advertisers) rather than that of quality news to the people. Describing the media's "societal purpose", Chomsky writes, "... the study of institutions and how they function must be scrupulously ignored, apart from fringe elements or a relatively obscure scholarly literature". Propaganda model focuses on the inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel effects on mass-media interests and choices. It traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public.The theory postulates five general classes of "filters" that determine the type of news that is presented in news media. These five classes are:

1. Ownership of the medium
2. Medium's funding sources
3. Sourcing
4. Flak
5. Anti-communist ideology

                                                           

Kerala society has become a ‘media society’ where a large majority of the people depend on the media both visual and print for their idea formation. So the role of the media in the formation of ideas in the public sphere is crucial. The public sphere in Kerala was traditionally characterised by two qualities—one its democratic nature and second its secular nature. However, today, the mainstream media in Kerala appears to be negating these basic qualities of the public sphere. The mainstream media act with a specific view point and that is one of rightist view point

The public sphere in Kerala, which evolved as a composite product of the renaissance, the freedom movement and the Left political interventions, is practically dead today and that the major challenge before movements and individuals in the coming days should be its revival. The most tragic aspect of life in Kerala today is the withdrawal of individuals from society and the reluctance of the majority to intervene in societal issues. According to K N Panicker "Public sphere is not the concern of a few institutions, it embraces the whole society, but the tragedy of Kerala is that the majority has chosen to distance from it,"Media, he said, was playing a crucial role in the denudation of the public sphere and pointed out that the quality of media content should be closely and critically examined

Whatever remains of the public sphere in Kerala has been coloured by caste and communal thinking and there was a very powerful force behind this process. The dynamics of the public sphere in Kerala was now being determined by the culture industry through the mass media. In order for the public to renew their stake in media, it is essential that media ownership and control be regulated so as to prevent existing media monopolies from increasing their stake in the media industry. The government should increase its commitment for community radio and television at district and local levels. Citizens’ movements that are committed towards reforms in the media industry should be encouraged. It is a fact that the press, television channels and the entire media could be a business. But the journalists per se are not for trade or business. Journalism is a social responsibility. It is a struggle to gain public space within the private sphere.

Over the years the corporate sector has developed its own press and channels. The political parties have their own newspapers. The governments in this country have also promoted their own medium of mass communication. But the voluntary organizations, groups engaged in movements, associations of the oppressed castes and the citizens engaged in promoting alternative politics which have grown manifold in the post-independence era in terms of its sheer number and the area of operation, have not been able to develop their own press or television channels with a mass reach and sound credentials. It may be noted that different civil society formations have developed and are running their own medium of communications, like small magazines or newsletters. But these do not have an impact on a macro level and have not been able to develop a professional form. The challenge to develop a reliable TV channel, a TV programme, a radio programme or at least a magazine is before all those who are engaged in various ways to promote and support alternative movements, alternative social groups and alternative models of development.

Most newspapers have to attract and maintain a high proportion of advertising in order to cover the costs of production; without it, they would have to increase the price of their newspaper. There is fierce competition throughout the media to attract advertisers; a newspaper which gets less advertising than its competitors is put at a serious disadvantage. Lack of success in raising advertising revenue was another factor in the demise of the 'people's newspapers' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The product is composed of the affluent readers who buy the newspaper — who also comprise the educated decision-making sector of the population — while the audience includes the businesses that pay to advertise their goods. According to this filter, the news itself is nothing more than "filler" to get privileged readers to see the advertisements which makes up the real content, and will thus take whatever form is most conducive to attracting educated decision-makers. Stories that conflict with their "buying mood", it is argued, will tend to be marginalized or excluded, along with information that presents a picture of the world that collides with advertisers' interests. The theory argues that the people buying the newspaper are themselves the product which is sold to the businesses that buy advertising space; the news itself has only a marginal role as the product

Now the elite media are sort of the agenda-setting media. They set the general framework. Local media more or less adapt to their structure. And they do this in all sorts of ways: by selection of topics, by distribution of concerns, by emphasis and framing of issues, by filtering of information, by bounding of debate within certain limits. They determine, they select, they shape, they control, they restrict -- in order to serve the interests of dominant, elite groups in the society.

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Ignoring lessons of Bhopal and Chernobyl

BRAHMA CHELLANEY 

The government’s nuclear-accident liability bill seeks to burden Indian taxpayers with a huge hidden subsidy by protecting foreign reactor builders from the weight of the financial consequences of severe accidents.

The Hindu newspaper, February 16, 2010

The vaunted civil nuclear deal with the United States came into effect in 2008, with the U.S. Congress attaching a string of conditions to the ratification legislation, the Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-Proliferation Enhancement Act (NCANEA). The Indian Parliament was allowed no role to play, not even to examine the deal’s provisions. But having sidelined Parliament on the main deal, the government now wants it to pass a special law to provide foreign companies with liability protection in case of nuclear accidents. Such a law has been demanded by U.S. firms, which, unlike their state-owned French and Russian competitors, are in the private sector.

It is important to remember that the promises on which the deal was sold to the country have been belied, one by one. For example, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had exulted in 2008 that the deal “marks the end … of the technology-denial regime against India.” Yet, just last month, his Defence Minister conveyed to U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates India’s “concerns regarding denial of export licences for various defence-related requirements of the armed forces” and other “anomalous” technology restrictions.

After the 123 Agreement was clinched, Dr. Singh told Parliament in 2007 that an “important yardstick has been met by the permanent consent for India to reprocess.” But in 2010, India is still negotiating with the U.S. to secure a right to reprocess spent fuel. The U.S., in any event, has no intention of granting India “permanent consent,” with the State Department having notified Congress that the proposed arrangements with India “will provide for withdrawal of reprocessing consent.” 

The biggest fiction, of course, was to present the deal as the answer to the country’s burgeoning energy needs. Nuclear energy cannot be a reasonable solution for any country because plants take too long to build and cost far too much. The first plant to be set up under the deal is likely to generate electricity, in the rosiest scenario, not before 2016.

In a more-plausible scenario, the timeline may stretch up to 2020, given the three reactor-exporting countries’ record. While the U.S. has built no plant in many years, Russia is still struggling to complete its much-delayed twin reactors in Kudankulam, India. As for France, its two new plants under construction, one in Finland and the other at home, are billions of dollars over budget and years behind schedule.

The bigger question, which New Delhi consistently has shied away from discussing, is about the cost of electricity from foreign-built reactors. India’s heavily-subsidised indigenous nuclear power industry is supplying electricity at between 270 and 290 paise per kilowatt hour from the reactors built since the 1990s. That price is far higher than the cost of electricity from coal-fired plants. But electricity from foreign-built nuclear reactors will be even dearer. That, in effect, will increase the burden of subsidies on the Indian taxpayers, even as the reactor imports lock India into an external-fuel dependency.

To compound matters, the government’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Bill, proposed to be introduced in the upcoming Parliament session, amounts to yet another tier of state subsidy, even if a hidden one. The bill is designed to shield foreign-reactor builders from the weight of the financial consequences of severe accidents. It shifts the primary burden for accident liability from the foreign builders to the Indian state. Although its text has not yet been made public, the bill is said to cap total compensation payable in the event of a severe radioactive release at Rs. 2,250 crore ($483 million), with the liability of the foreign supplier restricted to a trifling Rs. 300 crore ($64.6 million).

That represents an Indian taxpayer subsidy to foreign firms to help slash their cost of doing business in India. Each foreign reactor will carry a price tag of several billion dollars. Given that India has agreed to award contracts specifically to U.S., French and Russian firms, each such foreign supplier is expected to build more than one twin-reactor plant. India indeed has agreed in writing to import at least 10,000 megawatts of nuclear power-generating capacity from the U.S. alone. While each such firm stands to rake in billions of dollars in profit from the Indian market, its accident liability is being capped virtually at a pittance.

The partial core meltdown almost 31 years ago at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania didn’t kill anyone, but it led to 14 years of clean-up costing $1 billion. Despite India’s own bitter experience over the Union Carbide gas catastrophe at Bhopal, the government wants the Indian taxpayers to carry the can for foreign reactor builders. Why cap liability on terms financially prejudicial to Indian interests?

Worse still, India — instead of facilitating open market competition — is seeking to protect foreign firms from the market. From procuring land for them for reactor construction to freeing them from the task of producing electricity at marketable rates, India is doing everything to rig the terms of doing business in their favour. By designating nuclear parks for foreign-built reactors, the government has reserved reactor sites exclusively but separately for the U.S., France and Russia. In the same way it has signed billions of dollars worth of arms contracts in recent years with the U.S. without any competitive bidding and transparency, New Delhi is set to award nuclear contracts on a government-to-government basis.

India’s nuclear-accident liability bill aims to help replicate what U.S. nuclear firms presently enjoy in their domestic market, where the Price-Anderson Act caps the industry’s liability for a severe radioactive release. But for each accident, the Price-Anderson liability system provides more than $10.5 billion in total potential compensation through a complex formula that includes insurance coverage carried by the reactor that suffered the accident, “retrospective premiums” from each of the covered reactors in operation in the U.S., and a 5 per cent surcharge. Washington assumes liability for any catastrophic damages from an accident only above the $10.5 billion figure (which is inflation-adjusted every five years and thus variable).

Why should a poor country like India assume liability from a ridiculously low threshold? In fact, to cover claims of personal injury and property damage in the event of a catastrophic nuclear accident, India — given the density of its population and the consequent higher risks — must also maintain a large standby compensation pool, but without the state being burdened.

Another troubling aspect of the proposed Indian legislation is that while the Price-Anderson Act permits economic (but not legal) channelling of liability, thereby allowing lawsuits against any party, New Delhi is granting foreign suppliers immunity from legal actions — however culpable they may be for an accident — by introducing legal channelling of all liability to the Indian state (which will run the foreign-built plants through its Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited). What will it do to nuclear safety to free foreign suppliers upfront from “the precautionary principle” and “the polluter pays principle” and turn their legal liability for an accident into mere compensation, that too at an inconsequential level?

To be sure, without a cap on liability damages in India, U.S. firms would be exposed to unlimited liability. But in its effort to help create a congenial environment for them to do business in India, should the state gratuitously assume the principal financial burden in the event of an accident? The proposed Indian cap is well below international levels. Japan, for example, has boosted its plant operator liability to120 billion yen ($1.33 billion). Under the OECD’s 2004-amended Paris Convention, total liability was set at €1.5 billion ($2.04 billion), with the operator’s share being nearly half. Germany, for its part, has unlimited operator liability and demands € 2.5 billion ($3.4 billion) security from each plant’s operator.

After the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, with its transboundary consequences, international efforts were initiated to harmonise rules on liability and compensation. But those efforts have been stymied by the failure to bring all relevant international instruments into force. States with a majority of the world’s present 436 nuclear power reactors are not yet party to any international liability convention. Many countries still maintain a “wait and see” approach. For example, China, Japan and the U.S. are not party to any international liability convention, while Russia — a party to the Vienna Convention since 2005 — has refused to pass legislation to waive or cap accident liability for its foreign suppliers. China has yet to erect a formal domestic liability regime, although its State Council in 1986 issued an administrative legal document as an “interim” liability measure.

When a number of nuclear-generating countries are yet to adopt domestic legislation in this field, let alone ratify international conventions, why is New Delhi in a rush to pass a bill that caps liability on terms weighted in favour of foreign suppliers? Parliament indeed should seize the opportunity offered by the liability bill to scrutinise the nuclear deal in its entirety.

(c) The Hindu, 2010.

Book Review Essay

International Relations of Asia

David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, eds. (2008) Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield

Anil Kumar P

The regional order in Asia today still bears many of the hall marks that have characterised it for a number of decades: the American presence and alliance system, a rising China, an uncertain Japan, a divided Korea, China-Taiwan and the existence of security dilemmas, entrenched nationalism, dynamic economic growth, educated societies and disciplined work forces. These characteristics continue to distinguish Asian international relations. But in addition to the persistence of these traditional features, a variety of new features have also appeared that are reshaping the regional dynamics and creating a new regional order. These include the rise of India, a re-engaged Russia; the rebalancing of major power relations; the growth of intraregional and extra regional multilateral institutions and forums; the growing impact of “soft power” in intercultural relations; the ascent of political and radical Islam; the advent of terrorism; the rise of various “non-traditional” security threats; the growing danger of separatist movements; ( in China, India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka) and the increased military modernization across the region. Thus Asian international relations also reflect these relatively new phenomena - all of which have added to their complexity and diversity. Analyzing all these issues through a single volume is a difficult task as far as any scholar of the field is concerned.  David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda have drawn together a stellar cast of some of the brightest and most thoughtful analysts and practitioners from Asia, Europe, and North America. The result is a compendium which is intellectually stimulating, organizationally well-structured, and analytically sensible, helping us grasp the remarkable dynamism of international relations across Asia today. The emergence of new issues about the region makes the task of teaching non-specialists about the region a daunting task. Moreover, the recent wave of literature on Asian security and foreign relations has done little to alleviate this difficulty. Simply stated, most of this work has been weighed down with an over-reliance on academic jargon and a disproportionate amount of attention to divisive policy debates. As a result, it has been of limited utility for those (whether in the classroom or the halls of power) in need of a balanced overview of the region. David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda’s International Relations of Asia goes a long way toward rectifying this situation.

This edited work have seven sections, which contains sixteen essays by leading scholars combine interpretive richness and factual depth. Taken together, they provide a one-stop education on the dynamics of the globe's most dynamic region. The first section of the book begins with Shambaugh’s introductory chapter International Relations in Asia: The two- level game. According to him international relations in Asia are changing in many significant ways and at two principal levels: state-to-state and society-to-society. As a consequence a new regional system is emerging. While the governments in Asia interact and co-operate on many issues, they still evince suspicious and occasional tensions. Major power interactions remain volatile. Yet at a second level, the societies of the region are interconnected to an unprecedented degree. To some extent this interdependence acts as a buffer against potential interstate rivalry and conflict. This introductory chapter explicates these two levels for understanding international relations in Asia today.

The subsequent chapters in this volume are all testimony to the old and new dynamics of the region. The contributions address the traditional and changing role of external powers (the Unites States, Europe and Russia), regional powers (China and Japan), and the emergence of new actors ( India, Australia, Central Asia); the role of ASEAN, the Shanghai Co-Operation Organization, and the gradually emerging multilateral regional architecture; the troublesome Korean peninsula; and the three important functional features of the emerging regional order: economics, globalisation, and regional security. Even though the chapters raise and elaborate different components of the emerging regional system in Asia, the reminder of the introduction by David Shambaugh provides his own sense of the dominant macro trends in foreign policy.

In the next two chapters, Samuel Kim and Amitav Acharya, respectively, place contemporary international relations in Asia in both historical and theoretical perspective. Prof.Kim in his article The Evolving System: Three Transformations, analyses the historical overview of the “Asian” international system as it evolved and mutated through three systemic transformations from the early nineteenth century to the end of the cold war. The first four sections of his article critically apprises the main features of the Chinese tribute system as well as its progressive unraveling from the opium war of 1839-1842 to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. The second section examines the rise and fall of the Japanese imperial system from the end of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 to the end of the World War II in 1945. The third section examines the rise and demise of the cold War system (1947-1989). The fourth and concluding section looks at the impact and implications of these three systemic transformations for the future of Asian international relations in the post-Cold war world. Taken together these three transformations, there is no past can serve as desirable and feasible guide for the future of Asian international relations. Both the Japanese imperial system and the Clod War system reflected a sharp break from their predecessors. The emerging post cold war Asian system also represents a discontinuity from the three past systems tracked and analyzed in this study.

Amitav Acharya in his chapter Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia argued that any discussion of theoretical perspectives on the international relations in Asia confronts the paradox that much of the available literature on the subject remains atheoritical. Even among those writers on Asian international relations who are theoretically oriented, disagreement persists as to whether international relations theory is relevant to studying Asia, given its origin in, and close association with, western historical traditions, intellectual discourses, and foreign policy practices. While Samuel Kim’s chapter looks at the historical underpinnings of the current Asian order, Amitav Acharya’s contribution considers the utility of applying differing strands of international relations theorizing to the region. While both chapters were written by well-known experts in the field, they suffer to a certain degree from failing to fully engage Shambaugh’s opening observations about the necessity to include different levels of analysis in describing and explaining contemporary Asian international relations. Fortunately, in composite, the rest of the volume more fully explores the empirical realities of such a proposition.

The strength of the book lies in the generally informative case studies. Section three focuses on the major powers in the region. Such a survey begins with a consideration of the role external powers play in Asia. This discussion is led by Robert Sutter’s concise assessment of American policies toward the region. In the chapter The United States in Asia, Sutter examines significant challenges to U.S interests and influence in Asia at the start of the twenty-first century and it then discerns to enduring U.S strengths, forecasts durable American regional leadership, and considers alternative out comes. According to the author the Asian “hedging” reinforces U.S leadership in the region. Sutter’s observations are complemented by Sebastian Bersick’s description of Europe’s place in Asia. In the chapter Europe in Asia author traced the fact that European Union and its members are the natural partners of an Asian region that seeks to develop a regional system which transcends the perceptions, concepts and behaviour patterns of the Cold War. He also analysing the role of China, India, Japan and ASEAN in this particular context. According to the author European Union is neither pursuing a containment strategy nor a balancing strategy with regard to the development of a new regional system in Asia. Instead Europeans are convinced that regional integration and interregional cooperation are important instruments in promoting their economic interests Vis-à-vis Asia as well as their interest in a stable regional security environment.

Section four of the book contains three important chapters on the regional powers of Asia. Phillip C Saunders chapter on China’s Role in Asia argues that China’s reassurance strategy has been remarkably successful in preserving a stable regional environment and persuading its neighbours to view China as an opportunity rather than a threat. However, despite China’s restrained and constructive regional behaviour over the last decade, significant concerns remain about how stronger and less constrained China might behave in the future. Sumit Ganguly in his chapter on The Rise of India in Asia examines the transformation of India’s grand strategy in the post cold war era and the reactions of other major powers in Asia and assess the possibilities and limits of India’s emergence as a great power. The central argument of this chapter is that India aspires to be a major Asian power and is pursuing hedging strategy against the Peoples’ Republic of China, its most likely and keenest competitor for a similar status in Asia. The chapter also contends that while other major states in Asia are not concerned or distressed with India’s rise, the PRC does view India’s attempt to break free from its sub continental status with growing concern. Sumit Ganguly’s in-depth analysis is an excellent contribution to this section. Michael Green’s chapter on Japan in Asia is dedicated to the analysis of Japan’s relations with China, Korean Peninsula, U.S-Japan alliance in Asia’s strategy, strength and weakness of Japan’s diplomacy etc. This chapter ends with the observation that Japan’s security environment and strategic trajectory will be determined by the structure of power relations with the nature of economic interdependence and institution building.

The following two sections of the volume move discussion in the direction of other factors and influences that play within the emerging Asian foreign policy and security dynamic. Section five considers “sub-regional” actors of the region. This section contains four chapters. Sheldon W Simon’s chapter on ASEAN and the New Regional Multilateralism explores ASEAN’s evolution, current position of and its multilateralism. Huge White’s Chapter on Australia in Asia analyses the changing nature of its power relations in the context of emerging China. Martha Brill Olcott in the chapter Central Asia traces the changes that have occurred in Central Asia in the context of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and ‘Great Game’. Scott Synder in his chapter on The Korean Peninsula and North Eastern Stability explores how the North Korean nuclear issue has been a catalyst for ad hoc multi literalism in Northeast Asia. This chapter also analyses the prospects for regional rivalry between China, Japan and Korea. While the chapters in this section are informative, the conceptual focus of this part of the book is somewhat muddled as there is a confusing tendency throughout to slide between reviewing nascent international institution building (with reference to ASEAN, the SCO and the six-party talks) and more diffused discussion of the emerging relationship in Asia between weaker and stronger states.

Section six of the book intended to bring attention to transnational linkages via an introduction to regional economic and security flows. All the three chapters of this section are important in the sense that they are addressing the economic, security and geopolitical aspects, its trans-regional linkages and regional dynamic. Edward J. Lincoln’s chapter on The Asian Regional Economy addresses the economic landscape, trade flows and its expanding experience in the region. Nayan Chanda’s chapter on Globalization and International Politics in Asia analyses new players in economy and security due to globalisation. He started from migrants and tourists   and moving through NGOs, other new non-state actors. His analysis on cyberspace as the new arena of contestation is significant in this context. Ralph A. Cossa’s thought provoking chapter Security Dynamics in Asia explores the geopolitics and regional institutions. It analyses the role of ASEAN, APEC, ARF etc. The concluding section of the book is written by Michael Yahuda, in which he writes about a new order in Asia in the context of a declining United States. He concluded by writing that “the main determinant of the evolution of Asian international relations in the immediate future will be the relative strength and endurance of Unite Sates. China can be expected to continue to rise and to increase its influence, but the key question will be how the United States responds and how the other Asian states appraise that response”.

In sum, while International Relations of Asia is the product of a prestigious group of specialists, it is neither overly academic nor excessively caught up in specific policy issues. Rather, it is informative, nuanced, and insightful. More broadly, it is ideally suited as a primer for anyone with a budding interest in the complex security and foreign policy dynamic taking shape in the region.

Synopsis of My Research Work on Strategic Dimensions of Sino-US Relations on South Asian Securiy in the Post cold war Period

SYNOPSIS

Strategic Dimensions of Sino-US Relations on South Asian Security
in the Post Cold war Period

ANIL KUMAR. P.

Introduction

Both the United States and China are going to walk a tight rope, balancing each other's interests and priorities. China is a growing world economic power with its threefold theory and market socialism and its conflicting and strategic relationship with US constitute a new era in international politics in the post cold war phase. In the absence of a core conflict in international system, regional security dynamics have assumed greater importance. In the post cold war period while some regions have undergone peaceful change, others have experienced unprecedented conflict. Since 1990, South Asia has been in the news for a number of reasons. Since 1990, South Asia has been in the news for a number of reasons. Security concerns, problems of economic reforms, political instability, democratization, ethnic conflicts regional conflict and co-operation, the nuclear tests of May 1998 and the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1999, all these have made the region a turbulent zone over the past decade. The US and China are two major powers having considerable influence over the region. Their divergent interests in the area have very much significance regarding the security of South Asia. Terrorism, nuclearisation and the South Asian powers engagement with it provided a realm of strategic relationship and the security concerns of South Asia connected with it assumes a special significance.

Statement of the Problem

In this era of globalization, inevitably Washington and Beijing are moving towards strategic competition and great power rivalry. In this context there exists a question that whether this power rivalry and conflicts can be peacefully managed or not. As economy and military strength are the two major factors behind the power consolidation Sino-US Relations are analysed on the basis of this. It is necessary to find out problems and prospects related to it. China is considered by US as a competitor and a potential regional rival at the same time it is a trading partner willing to co-operate with the US in certain areas including containment of terrorism. Taiwan issue, US surveillance activities in the South China Sea, issues related to Human Rights etc constitute problems in Sino-US relations. The impact of Sino-US relations and its implications up on the security of South Asia is a significant factor in the context that the strategic allies of both these powers in South Asia going to face a dilemma in their attitude towards these nations. India's growing relations with United States and China's strong and continuing relationship with Pakistan create a new phase regarding South Asian Security. Nuclear explosions, arms race and conflicts between India and Pakistan and both United States and China's attitude towards it constitute an important factor. Obviously the balance of South Asian security is mainly depended up on these nations.
Will the US avoid the error of abandoning Afghanistan after its goal of ridding the region of AlQueda is met? Will it remain engaged sufficiently with Pakistan to help restructure that country's domestic institutions and its external priorities? These are important questions in this specific context of study. India's co-operation with United States in National Missile Defence and China's nexus with Pakistan also creates a problematique area in South Asian security. To what extent economic relations between US and China and both them have with South Asia can provide an adequate basis for not only reducing tensions but also promoting increased co-operation is also a matter of doubt. It may be noted that during 1956-1973 China's ties with India were at the lowest ebb. Nearly 20% of China's total world aid was targeted to the other South Asian countries with Pakistan receiving 13.1%, Sri Lanka 3.5%, and Nepal 2.9%. On the basis of this historical fact the present situation wanted a thorough and deep study regarding Sino-US relations and South Asian Security.

Significance of the Study

China's experiment with "Market Socialism" provide a strong economic base to China and now it is growing as a world power. It is viewed by the scholars as a great threat to Untied States and its hegemony. Because in South East Asia and South Asia they have divergent and conflicting interests and both these nations are in different position regarding certain international issues. United States arms sales to Taiwan, their surveillance activities in South China Sea and different issues regarding human rights etc constitute problems between China and United States. As having a powerful influence over South Asia by both these nations, the relationship between both creates some security issues. Any problem in bilateral relationship of both these nations and its impact up on South Asia which was an important component of the world, boasting as it does a vast land area of five million square km and 1-3 billion diligent and talented people will endanger the whole security of the world. The future of South Asian security and both these nations ties with the region will depend largely on the continued diplomatic skills and policy orientations that actors exhibit in the months and years ahead. In this context the study about strategic-economic dimensions of Sino-US relations and its impact up on the security of South Asia is a contemporary one and having so much significance in the era of globalization.

Objectives of the Study

1. To analyse the military dimensions of Sino-US relations and its problems and prospects in the post cold war era.
2. To find out the divergent interests of US and China in South Asia and to analyse how it will affect the region, especially in the context of the nuclear experiments of India and Pakistan.
3. To understand the attitude and perception of political forces in India and Pakistan towards the impact on the Sino-US relations and its impact on South Asia.
4. To trace the future prospects in bilateral relations and the future of South Asian Security

Hypothesis

On the basis of the above-mentioned objectives following hypothesis can be formulated.
1. Divergent strategic competition and power rivalry between US and China can redefine the security concerns in South Asia.
2. The attitude and perception of political forces in India and Pakistan towards the impact on US-China relations and its impact on South Asia is an important factor in shaping the future Sino-US relations.
3. Diverging interests of US and China in India and Pakistan may compelled them to the redefinition of their security concerns in South Asia.
4. The strategic allies of both US and China in South Asia are now in a dilemma in their attitude towards these super powers because of the mutual suspect, historical estrangements and conflicting interests. Their ties with these powers and vice-versa will depend on largely on the continued diplomatic skills and policy orientations that actors exhibit in the era of globalization.

Methodology

Methodology adopted for the will be a combination of historical, analytical and empirical. The data will be drawn from primary and secondary sources. Primary data are collected from the publications of MEA, speeches and policy statements of the leaders of the different nations and interview with diplomats, leaders, scholars, journalists etc. Books, Journals, Periodicals, News papers etc will be used as secondary source. Internet sources will also be consulted.

Plan of Work

1) Theoretical framework
2) Sino-US Relations and south Asian Security: A Historical background
3) Strategic and military dimensions of Sino-US relation in the post cold war era
4) Sino-US Relations and South Asian Security: Perspectives of India and Pakistan
5) Sino-US Relations and South Asian Security in the Changing Context
6) Major Findings and Conclusion

INDIA AND US: FROM ESTRANGEMENT TO ENGAGEMENT

INDIA AND US: FROM ESTRANGEMENT TO ENGAGEMENT

(Anil Kumar P*)

The end of the cold war freed India-US relations from the constraints of global bipolarity, but interactions continued for a decade to be affected by the burden of history, most notably the longstanding India- Pakistan rivalry and nuclear weapons proliferation in the region. Recent years, however have witnessed a sea change in bilateral relations, with more positive interactions becoming the norm. India’s swift offer of full support for US led counter terrorism operations after September11, 2001 was widely viewed as a reflective of such change. The recent agreement titled New Frame work for the US-India Defense Relationship signed by our Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee on June 28, 2005 and the joint statement issued by the two countries during the time of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to US tell us the fact that India-US relations are ‘transforming and forging a strategic partnership’

A number of independent developments carrying together have created the climate for the transformation of our ties. To begin with, the end of cold war and the consequent rearrangement of interstate ties allowed both India and the US to revisit their relationship and redefine it to address contemporary opportunities and challenges.

Second, this exercise in reassessment would not have had the same value and results if India had remained economically stagnant. Instead, fifteen years of reform and a growing integration with global process has made India a dynamic force with still greater potential for the future. United States looks at enormous economic profits. India has a population of more than 1 billion, which means a big market. India has already become the third largest economy in Asia after Japan and China. It is believed that cooperation with India in the economic field is of vital importance for the United States to maintain it’s superpower status(Zhang Lijun 2005: p-12)

Third, the “China factor” is a strong boost to US- India relations. A US think-tank Carnege Endowment for International Peace , recently issued a report on the US agenda with regard to the rising power of India namely India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States. This report pointed out that considering India will possess a potential developing ability in the next 20 to 25 years, the Bush administration should help the country become an Asian super power that could counterbalance China[1].

The more pressing issues also contributed to clearer understanding of our shared interests. Global threats today emanate from nation states bent on aggrandisement and more from trans-national non-state actors. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction(WMD) proliferation, pandemics, natural disaster and illegal narcotics are some examples of problems that can only be addressed through greater global cooperation. No single state, however strong, can bear global burden alone. Naturally in forging new partnerships, countries that share common values and now perceive common interests as well would come together. Finally the image of India in the United States has undergone a radical change, associated as it is with a successful and professionally prominent Indian community. Similarly, the opening of the Indian economy also encouraged India’s civil society to expand its interactions with the United States.

India and US Since 1982:From Estranged to Engaged Democracies

It is worth noting that the ‘transformation’ in India- US relations emerged from a fairly long process. The origin can be traced clearly back to Indira Gandhi’s interest in a more constructive and flexible relationship with Washington as early as 1982. She had an eye to India’s economic development and its access to sorely needed technology to modernize Indian production(Kanti Bajpai 2005:p.3577). After her death, Rajiv Gandhi took the process forward. His state visit to the US in 1985 resulted in a greater defense cooperation between the two and in particular the sale of defense equipments(Kanti Bajpai 2005:p3577).With the end of cold war, it was Nara Simha Rao who took the next major steps towards a close relationship with the US. His concerns were primarily economic in the wake of India’s financial crisis of 1990-‘91. Fall of Soviet Union also accelerated the process. But the links were broken at the time when India conducted its nuclear tests in 1998. The next milestone in India-US relationship was the Jaswant Singh Strobe Talbot talks that were held from 1999-2001.

When George W Bush came to power in January 2001, among the strategic statements he made was that he sought a much closer relationship with India. He extolled India’s democracy and publicly declared his administrations interest in cultivating India. It was no secret that he and his security advisers regarded China as a possible counterweight. The NDA government responded with enthusiasm. Perhaps the clearest expression of the Indian governments interest in a new relationship was its support to the Bush administrations controversial decision to build missile defense and its hope that India would be partner in missile defense initiative. India’s turn towards Washington increased dramatically after the events of September 11, 2001. the NDA government immediately offered the US virtually any military help it might require in responding to the attacks on the American mainland.

This brief survey of India-US relations reveals the following things.

· First, as noted earlier, India and US have been engaged in a fitful but rather steady rapprochement for over two decades interrupted only briefly by the nuclear tests of 1998.
· Second, on both the Indian and US side. In India, each of the three major formations- the Congress, the BJP and the Third Front have been involved in deepening the engagement.
· Third, every Indian government has tried to work with the US on nuclear matters.
· Fourth, stronger military-to-military links has been pursued by every Indian government since Narasimha Rao. After september11, 2001 these links have included regular intelligence sharing, particularly in respect of terrorism

Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)

George W. Bush resolved, prior to assuming his office in January 2001 that his administration would alter the character of this important bilateral relationship in order to permanently entrench the large, vibrant and successful democracy that is India in the ranks of US friends and allies. In Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s Prime Minister at that time, Bush found a perfect partner- statesman, who equally weary of a history of US-Indian antagonism and strongly inclined to regard the United States and India as “natural allies”[2]. From 2001-2003, the courtship between the United States and India grew in ardor and expectations. Thanks to a series of breakthroughs in bilateral, diplomatic collaborations. This paved the way for Bush administration’s major first- term diplomatic achievement- Next Step in Strategic Partnership(NSSP). This agreement, which was announced in January 2004, drew its inspiration from the Bush –Vajpayee joint statement of November 2001[3]. NSSP was heralded as a breakthrough in US -Indian strategic collaboration. Since 2001, the Indian government has pressed the United States to ease restrictions on the export to India of dual-use-high technology goods, as well as to increase in civilian nuclear and space cooperation. These three key issues came to be known as the trinity and top Indian officials stated that progress in these areas was necessary to provide tangible evidences of a changed US- India relationship(K Alan Kranstadt 2005:p14.). There were later reference to a “quartet” when the issue of missile defense was included. In late 2003, Secretary of State Powell asserted that progress was being made on the “glide path” towards agreement on the “trinity” issues. NSSP declared in January 2004, indicating that the US-India “Strategic Partnership” includes expanding cooperation in these areas as well as expanding dialogue on Missile Defense. But some nongovernmental US experts believe that although India is not regarded as a proliferators of sensitive technologies, US obligations under existing law may limit significantly the scope of NSSP engagement. (K Alan Kranstadt 2005:p14.).

The New Frame Work

In June, 2005 US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and visiting Indian Defense Minister Pranab Muakherjee singed a ten year India-US military cooperation agreement namely New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship. The new frame work defines some key political principles agreed on by both sides, a set of common interest , a plan of action, and an institutional frame work to advance those interests. In the service of these interests, the two countries pledge to implement 13 measures, these measures are rendered in a long list in the agreement, but they can be arrange in four areas of what we could called capacity building.

Cognitive capacity building
· Conduct exchanges on defense strategy and defense transformation
· Increase in flow of intelligence information
· Deepen security discussion between the two sides

Hardware capacity building
· Expand defense trade between India and the US
· Increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, cooperation and research and development.
· Expand missile defense collaboration

Capacity building in bilateral security.
· Joint and combined exercise and exchanges
· Strengthen their military capabilities in respect of security and terrorism.
· Improve capacities to deal with proliferation
· Improve the responses of their militaries to disaster situations.

Capacity building for multilateral security.
· Cooperate in multi national operations
· Interact with third countries to ensure regional and global peace.
· Help to build peace keeping capacities world wide.

Finally the document outlines the institutional architecture within which they will cooperate more intensively. This includes the continuation of the Defense Policy Group(DPG) and the establishment of a Defense Procurement and Production Group and a Defense Joint Working Group. The DPG is the “primary mechanism to guide the US-India strategic defense relationship”. The Procurement and Production group will “oversee defense trade, as well as prospects for co production and technology collaboration”. The Joint Working Group will serve as a review committee which will measure progress in the various groups and subgroups twice a year.

The Nuclear Deal.

The recent Indo-US nuclear deal is a remarkable progress in India-US relationship. As part of the nuclear deal with the US, India has agreed to identify and separate all civilian and military nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguard regime[4]. The successful implementation of the deal would depend on how the US view India’s plan for separation of facilities as well as its commitment to compliance with an additional protocol. Recently, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made the reassuring statement that work on separating India’s civilian military nuclear facilities was at a fairly advanced stage(Ashwin Kumar2005:p-5530).Since 1978, US law requires that US nuclear exports to states that were not NPT recognised nuclear weapon states could not be authorised unless they have full scope of safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities(Ashwin Kumar 2005:p-5530). India is a non Nuclear Weapon State under the NPT and also according to US law, and therefore this condition applies to it. To accomplish the goals mentioned in the deal, India needs to place all its nuclear facilities not directly associated with nuclear weapons production or deployment under safeguards. India has many civil nuclear facilities in this category (David Albright and Susan Basu 2005:p-1). What ever the nature of safeguard agreements implemented between India and the IAEA, they would not be full scope since India would continue to refrain unsafe guarded military facilities. Therefore, Nuclear cooperation on a continued basis would require changes to US laws (Ashwin Kumar 2005:p-5530). Critics argued that in order to realise the deal between India and US, a long way to go ahead.

Energy Security

The countries existing annual – crude oil production is peaked at about 32 million tonnes as against the current peak demand of about 110 million tonne. With inadequate crude production, the country is heavily dependent on imports. In the current scenario, India’s oil consumption by end of 2007 is expected to reach 136 million tonne (MT), of which domestic production will be only around 34 MT. India will have to pay an oil bill roughly 50 billion, assuming a weighted average price of $50 per barrel of crude. In 2003-’04 against total expert of $64 billion, oil imports accounted for $21 billion. If net invisible receipts are also included, then against a total receipt of around $90 billion, India paid out 23.33 percent of the receipts for import of petroleum crude and products. This is a crucial situation. Thanks to the present nuclear agreement between India TVS has a larger energy rationale, that should not be overlooked. Our foreign secretary stated that, “you must bear in mind that India and US are engaging not just on one element of the energy mix, we are exploring on clean coal technologies, on exploitation of coal-bed methane and gas hydrates, as carbon sequestration and on the hydrogen economy. To believe that civil nuclear energy is unimportant because it constitutes only 3% of India’s current energy production betrays a lack of understanding of our energy requirements and their emission implications. Civil nuclear energy currently limited precisely because of technology denial. If freed from current restrictions, there is little doubt that it will rapidly move into percentage of double digits. India is today partnering the US almost every international initiative on various aspects of energy. The US is contributing to our economic growth and we too are bringing our technology skills to the table. Our collaboration can help ease the growing pressures on the global energy market, where oil consumption has gone up four-fold over the last century. In most areas, market forces are driving transactions, but regulatory restrictions are blocking normal commerce in civil nuclear energy and must be addressed if India is to be a long-term partner. Ironically, continued technology denial targets the very reform-minded and forward thinking constituency in India that is in forefront of advocating a closer Indo-US partnership.

Conclusion

The texture and content of the present Indo-US exchanges are indicative of a constructive and robust bilateral engagement, potentially directed towards partnership-building based on “increasingly overlapping national interests”. The priority shift from non-proliferation to trade and commerce, terrorism, energy, security, regional security and stability and producting democracy, has helped to bridge the gap between the world’s largest and oldest democracies.

The equation between key officials in the present UPA government audits counterparts in the Bush Administration will be crucial in maintaining the direction momentum of India-US ties and forging ahead with a more robust relationship. Although the replacement of Colin Powell by Cardoleeza Rice as the US Secretary of State indicates the possibility of better bilateral ties given her stance on India.[5] In areas like Trade & Commerce, Counter-terrorism, energy, security, information technology etc. the interests of US and India is converging. India’s growth in the economic field and “China Cord” of US is boosting India-US relationship in an unconventional manner.

Considering the new stakes involved in the recently transformed relations and the prevailing atmosphere of prudence, neither country would be willing to jeopardize their new-found relationship. However, commitment and sensitivity towards each other’s national security interests will go a long way in concretizing and giving a definitive shape to this relationship.


* Anil Kumar P is a Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science, University of Kerala, Kariavattom Campus, Thiruvananthapuram. anil.sopanam@yahoo.com , anilanchal@gmail.com

Notes
[1] “ India As a New Global Powere: An Action Agenda for the United States” was a report published by Carnage Endowment for International Peace-a think tank in Washington DC. Author of the report is Ashley J Tellis and published in March 2005.
[2] “India, USA and the World”, Remarks by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the Asia Society, New York, September 28, 1998, available at www.asiasociety.org/speches/vajpayee.html.
[3] “ Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of India”, November 9,2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011109-10.html
[4] Joint Statement between President George W Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, office of the President, see the whitehouse, July18, 2005
[5] As the main foreign policy advisor to George W. Bush Jr. in the 2000 Presidential Campaign, Condoleezza Rice argued in an article published in Foreign Affairs that the “US should pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually in the US to connect India with Pakistan and to think only to Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.” Quoted in C. Raja Mohan, “For New Delhi, It is as Good as it Gets: Rice as Secy of State”, The Indian Express, November 17, 2004; Chidananda Rajghatta, “Rice Good on India’s Plate”, The Times of India, November 16, 2004.


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